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STUDENT ANALYSIS
I. TEE RECOGNITION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The ebb and flow of American constitutional law on the legal segregation of races
has produced many and varied marks on our society. In that law have been reflected
the great goals of a generation that bled to attain them, and the loss of those goals as
the interest of men was attracted elsewhere. Today those goals have again been adopted
by the organs of our federal society, not as the result of a great passion, but as the end
product of a long process of critical self-examination and re-evaluation. In our legal
history, intervention in aid of the negro minority has, as often as not, been associated
with the problems of federalism, and indeed, as we shall shortly see, that intervention
must often wait until the needs of the Negro have been recognized as existing within the
framework of a federal problem.
The first great tide of concern in the federal courts for the welfare of the negro
minority in this country came in the years following the War Between the States.
Speaking for the Supreme Court in 1879 in Strauder v. West Virginia,1 Mr. Justice
Strong articulated the conception of the fourteenth amendment as affording the negro
race "the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored, - exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and dis-
criminations which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a subject
race."2 In Strauder, a statute which provided that only white males could serve as
jurors was being challenged on the ground that it constituted a denial of due process,
and the attack was successful. The Court indicated that the law amounted to "an
assertion of their inferiority and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impedi-
ment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others." 3
These two passages, the first of which, significantly, is quoted in a footnote to
Brown v. Board of Educ.,4 represent the approximate position of the law today. We are,
as a nation, now officially concerned in our law with the racial problems to an extent
unknown for generations. In this section of our survey we will first examine how the
law left the bold position6 which it assumed shortly after the Civil War, and how it
came to assume its present posture.
The first step in this history was Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which rejected the broad
prospectus outline for the fourteenth amendment in Strauder and sought to deny the
1 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 303 (1879).
2 Id. at 308. See the adoption of this statement of the purpose of the amendment by the text
writers: CooLaY, CoNsTrrunioNAL LiMrrArxoNs 14 n. 1 (5th ed. 1883); BLACK, CONSTrrTUToNAL LAw
405 (1st ed. 1895).
3 100 U.S. at 308.
4 347 U.S. 483, 491 n.5 (1954).
5 Speaking of the colored race in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 303 (1879),
Justice Strong said at 306:
Their training had left them mere children and as such they needed the protection
which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect them-
selves .... It [the fourteenth amendment] was designed to assure to the colored
race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by
white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government,
in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States.
6 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The case involved the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute requiring
railroads to maintain separate but equal facilities for the white and negro races. The railroad involved
operated entirely within the state, so that the inter-state commerce rule of Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S.
(5 Otto.) 485 (1877), did not control. In the opinion an argument based on the thirteenth amendment
was rejected on the ground that it had not been shown that the statute resulted in an involuntary
(719)
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amendment any deep social significance. Strauder apparently was distinguished as
dealing with political equality, a matter not to be confused in legal consideration
with the separation of races in schools, theaters or (as was the case in Plessy) intra-
state transportation. 7 While such a result was admittedly possible by the use of the
"dictum-holding" distinction, it was evident that the broad principle enunciated in
Strauder could not be so easily restricted. Justice Brown, writing for the majority
in Plessy, apparently realized this, for later in the opinion a strenuous effort is made
to answer the objection that the allegedly discriminatory statute implied inferiority
of the Negro. The reply was a simple fiat that a law separating the races where they
are likely to come into contact does not necessarily imply such inferiority; if the
Negro supposes that it does, he alone entertains such an opinion.8 Years later, that
same problem of inferiority, raised in Strauder and found in a new context, was to
prove the great lever which overthrew Plessy.
On a broader plane, Plessy v. Ferguson represents a disengagement of federal law
from the problem of racial separation. Justice Brown indicated the retreat by noting
the inability of the law itself to eliminate racial prejudice9 so long as the device used
could be found to be reasonable.' 0 This reasoning was facilitated by the suggestion that
the mores of the community were relevant in determining the issue." If there were any
who, after Strauder,'2 believed that the Negro would be a quasi-ward of the federal
government, Plessy demonstrated that such a belief was untenable.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy, developed a theme which was to be expounded
again and again six decades later. He expressed the conviction that the post-war amend-
ments were designed to eliminate from state law color-based distinctions, which had
existed when slavery was an institution, and argued that a statute such as the one in-
volved in the case would make peace between the races unattainable. 13
Through the first thirty years of this century, the Court adhered to the interpretation
that Plessy had placed on the fourteenth amendment. The case had spoken broadly on
the whole field of race relations outside "political rights," and had a special pertinence
to the school problem in that Justice Brown had relied on several school cases to
buttress the Court's finding that the distinctions of the statute were reasonable. 14 Two
subsequent cases established the fine contours of the Plessy doctrine in the school
segregation field, drawing lines which are still being painfully erased and reset.
Three years after Plessy, in Cumming v. Board of Educ.15 where a negro high
school had been closed to enable the county to provide facilities for a negro grammar
school, Justice Harlan, this time writing for the majority, held that the state court was
justified in its refusal to enjoin the operation of the white high school until comparable
facilities could be supplied for colored children. He could see no logic in action which
would only harm the white students while failing to aid their negro counterparts.' 6
servitude for the Negro, i.e., that he had not been deprived of his legal right to dispose of his own
person, property or services. 163 U.S. at 542-43. Another claim that the Negro had a property right
to a social position equal to that of the white was similarly disallowed. Id. at 549.
7 The Court described the distinction as an established one but offered no citation supporting
the proposition. Note the language in another jury-selection case (decided the same day that Plessy
was argued, April 13, 1896), that discrimination in either political or civil rights was forbidden by
the Constitution. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896). Justice Harlan wrote the opinion
in Gibson and dissented in Plessy.
8 163 U.S. at 551.
9 Id. at 551-52.
10 The "reasonableness" had been examined earlier. Id. at 550-51.
11 Id. at 550.
12 See note 5, supra.
13 163 U.S. at 555, 560 (dissenting opinion).
14 The best known of these cases was Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
The Court in Plessy also cited the District of Columbia Statutes, D.C. REv. STAT. §§ 281, 282, 283,
310, 319 (1875), providing for segregated schools, as an expression of congressional opinion on the
matter. 163 U.S. at 545.
15 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
16 Id. at 544.
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Supporting the decision was the rationale that state-tax-supported education is a matter
of purely local concern, in which federal interference is justified only where there has
been a "clear and unmistakable" violation of the Constitution.' 7 While some hope was
extended to the petitioners by the suggestion that proof that existing funds were with-
held because of prejudice would raise different issues, the Negro could find little other
comfort from the opinion, which had placed a heavy burden on minorities going outside
their communities to seek protection against discrimination from within. The abandon-
ment of substantial solicitude for the Negro's rights, noted in Plessy, continued.
The implications arising from the use of school cases in Plessy were confirmed
in Gong Lum v. Rice,'8 which raised the issue of the power of a local school board to
establish separate school districts for colored and white children, while providing them
with equal facilities. To answer the question, Chief Justice Taft quoted the rationale
developed by Harlan in Cumming, laying its weighty burden on the plaintiff. But
recognizing that the problem was not so easily disposed of, the opinion went on to
observe that the issue was not a new one. If it had been, it might have merited a fuller
consideration. Since the constitutionality of such a practice had been affirmed in a
dozen lower federal and state court decisions, the Court chose not to re-open the
question. 19 The case concluded with a reference to the school cases cited in Plessy.
Taft's finding that the issue was closed tempts analysis. Surely a handful of lower
federal court decisions does not preclude the Supreme Court from reviewing an issue.
It would seem, therefore, that what led the Court to avoid the problem was the weight
of state authority coupled with a deference to local law in the manner of Cumming.
Decided in 1927, Gong Lum marks the low tide of concern in the Supreme Court
for the Negro in the schools. Yet despite such an attitude there appeared within the
opinion a distaste for the prevailing doctrine. During the next two decades, Negro
litigants seeking to attend non-segregated schools learned to work successfully with the
doctrine which had been set up against them, and eventually to destroy it.
The first successful thrust came in 1938, with Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.
20
Missouri maintained within its borders a law school for whites, but none for Negroes. A
statute provided monetary assistance to Negroes for study in whatever adjoining state
law schools would admit them. A significant fact for our purposes was that there had
been little demand from the Negroes for legal education. Here, then, was what appeared
to be a fair attempt to solve a difficult problem; arguably, there was no "clear and
unmistakeable" denial of equal protection. If the standards of the past had been used,
there is little doubt that the Court would have found no constitutional violation. But Chief
Justice Hughes, for the majority, rejected those standards and held that forcing the
Negro to travel out of the state, while permitting whites to study within it, was un-
constitutional. The Negro was held entitled to be educated at the state school until equal
facilities were provided for him. Thus, while the Court continued outwardly to bow to
tradition by retaining the "separate but equal" test (forced travel was characterized as
"unequal"), it is clear that a departure from the extreme positions of Cumming and
Gong Lum had been made.
This case became an "Alamein"2' for the negro plaintiff, for after it he never had
a real defeat where his cause could be brought squarely into issue. The local nature of
education problems had been measurably decreased as a matter of constitutional
significance. 22 After Gaines, the Court was free to examine extensively the educational
17 Id. at 545. For a suggestion as to what Justice Harlan would have considered as a proper
occasion for intervention, see Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
18 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
19 Id. at 85-86.
20 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
21 Speaking of the defeat of Rommel by the Eighth Army in 1942, Churchill has written: "It may
almost be said, 'Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat.'"
CHURCHILL, THE HINGE OF FATE 603 (1950).
22 In 1946 the Court ordered that a writ of mandamus issue for the admittance of a colored
plaintiff to the state school of law in a case where a state had made no provision within or without
the state for the legal education of the Negro. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 625 (1946).
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situation before it, without too much regard for the requirement that an extreme
situation exist before action could be taken. This change in emphasis made possible
Sweatt v. Painter,23 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,24 and finally Brown, all
three decisions ultimately resting on the actualities of the educational system under
consideration.
Gaines represents the kind of attack which was waged on discriminatory legislation
prior to World War II. It was simply claimed that the facilities provided to the Negro
were not equal to those afforded similarly situated whites. After the war, the NAACP,
which directed many of these efforts, altered the focus of its challenge. Segregation itself
was claimed to violate the Constitution.
25
The first cases to reach the Supreme Court involved the effect of segregation on
higher education. The Sweatt case concerned the law school which Texas had recently
established for Negroes. The Court found that the facilities were in fact unequal.2 6
Prior to 1940, such a finding would have been dispositive of the case. But to this hold-
ing the Court added a discussion of certain facets of a legal education which, while
incapable of precise detection under the test of equality which was limited solely to
physical facilities, nevertheless made it impossible in any event to provide separate
but completely equal facilities for professional education. The Court observed that the
practice of law is highly practical, and preparatory training for it cannot be carried on
in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law deals. The practice
is posited on an exchange and interplay of ideas, and on contact with people as a
whole. A legal training which cut its students off from these necessary contacts and
experiences was not the constitutional equal of one that did not.2 7
In the companion case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court found
that there might be a violation of the fourteenth amendment even where the same phys-
ical facilities (the same classes, classrooms, library and cafeteria) were available to the
Negro. For even the minor discriminations 28 practiced here handicapped the student
in his training, inhibited his ability to engage in discussion with his white fellow students,
and therefore failed to provide him with truly and completely equal facilities. 29 Of true
significance was the Court's disregard of a previously relevant factor - the law's in-
ability to produce unaided a happily integrated society. Chief Justice Vinson acknowl-
edged that the removal of state-enforced discriminations could not end prejudice, but
declared that the law ought not deprive the Negro of the opportunity to establish him-
self in the white community.3 0 Thus, the Court rejected the rationale of Plessy and
assumed approximately the same position it had taken some seventy years before in
Strauder, that the Constitution prohibits legal encouragement of racial prejudice.
One final step remained to be taken. In Sweatt, the Court had refused to reconsider
Plessy in light of the recent learning on the purposes of the fourteenth amendment and
the effects of segregation on the negro race. The framework for the ultimate attack
had been developed in the advanced education cases: define the nature and purposes of
the educational system in question and examine the effects of segregation on the ful-
fillment of those purposes. If the effect is deleterious, then the Constitution has been
violated. In those cases interference with communication between the students had been
the touchstone of decision. For the final effort a new concept was to be utilized by
counsel for the NAACP, a concept which had originated in other disciplines - per-
23 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
24 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
25 Clark, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness in Civil Rights Litigation, 1 SoCIAL PROBLEMS
5, 6 (1953).
26 339 U.S. at 633.
27 Id. at 634.
28 E.g., assignment to a seat in a classroom row reserved for Negroes, assignment to a special
seat in the cafeteria. Id. at 640.
29 The opinion observed that the harm done might be multiplied in its effects on future pupils
of the plaintiff, who was an education student. Id. at 641.
30 Id. at 641-42.
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sonality development. For our purposes the term seems to have been given its particular
denotation by the fact-finding report submitted in conjunction with the Midcentury
White House Conference on Children and Youth,3 ' a study which the Supreme Court
cites twice in Brown v. Board of Educ.3 2 The Conference Report describes personality
development as that process by which the child attains that character which makes him
the adult person he is to be. Two stages of personality development are particularly
relevant to school segregation, because they occur during the period of lower formal
education, and because the study has linked them with the educational process. The
first stage is the attainment of a sense of duty, which begins about the sixth year and
continues through the next six. The child at this time is engaged in learning how to do
things and learning how to do them well, in addition to learning to cooperate with others
and to follow the rules of society. The greatest threat to successful development at this
time is a situation which induces a feeling of inadequacy and inferiority in the child.
Other institutions have a responsibility here, but the main burden falls upon the
schools.
3 3
As the student begins his formal schooling the attributes which he has previously
developed, i.e., a sense of trust (his basic outlook on the world around him), a sense of
autonomy, and a sense of initiative, can be strengthened by a reconfirmation of what
he has previously attained, or by rehabilitation from the results of unfortunate ex-
periences.34
The inception of adolescence brings the problems of attaining a sense of identity,
the idea of the role that the youth is to have in society, and a questioning of the
possibilities of his success. It is a time when the person is acutely conscious of and
concerned with the opinion of society. Proper personality development here is in great
part dependent upon the self-esteem which has been previously developed in the child.
The report insists that if we are to successfully bring our youth through this period
our society must make good its promises to youth. Prior unhappy experience as a mem-
ber of a minority group may have made the preparation faulty and the proper result
difficult, although not impossible, to attain.3 5
This information provided a framework within which the attorneys for the Negro
were able to work out an attack on segregation.
The Conference Report contained an analysis of the effect of discrimination on the
personalities of the members of the minority group, based on then-current knowledge.
The Negro's sense of trust and of autonomy seemed to be under continuous assault from
childhood.3 6 The report indicated that negro children were trained to avoid offense to
the whites, with the result that their sense of initiative was retarded. The effects of
discrimination were found to weigh especially heavily on the adolescent, who is passing
through an independently difficult period.3 7 Not all of the minority-group children
become emotionally maladjusted; in fact, most of them do not. But they seem to have
paid a high price for their well-balanced personalities.
38
The study admitted that there had been little scientific investigation of the effects
of segregation, but the authors insisted that what had been done supported their
81 For a full discussion see WrrMER & KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING 3-162 (1952).
32 347 U.S. at 494, n. 11.
33 WrrmER & KoTiNsKy, op. cit. supra note 31 at 17-19. Cf., the statement in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954): "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
34 WITmmR & KOTINSKY, op. cit. supra note 31 at 19.
35 Id. at 19-22; see also the statement from Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954),
note 33, supra.
386 Cf., Weaver, Racial Sensitivity Among Negro Children, 17 PHYLON 52 (1956), a study based on
statements taken from negro school children on the incidents which led them to discover that they
were "Negroes."
37 Wrsmn & KoTNsKy, op. cit. supra note 31 at 136-38.
8 Ibid.
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hypotheses. 39 The Deutscher-Chein study, cited both by the authors of the Conference
Report and by the Court in Brown, was a survey of the opinions of social scientists on
the effects of enforced segregation. 40 Appropriately enough, the purpose of the research
was to gather relevent material for use in a court attack on segregation. The focal point
was the detrimental effects, if any, of enforced segregation in schools where the
facilities were otherwise equal. The methods of the study were elaborately documented,
41
but are far too detailed for discussion here. Most of the social scientists based their
answers on their own professional experience; over one-fourth on their own research.
Ninety percent of those who answered the questionnaire (53% of those questioned)
expressed the opinion that enforced segregation has a detrimental psychological effect
on the segregated groups. Many thought that it was impossible to maintain separate but
(truly) equal schools. Others noted that the discrepancy between democratic aspirations
and the practice of segregation caused damage to the personality of the Negro. Signif-
icantly, warning came from one group that any change must be effectuated cautiously
and with extensive preparations. Failure properly to effect the change could produce
detrimental long-term results.
42
A legal device was needed to put this information before the Court. Courts are
generally composed of professional men who can speak from their own experiences on
the requirements of professional training. Normally they do not possess an intimate
knowledge of the problems of elementary education. The device which was used was
that of the social scientist as an expert witness.
In 1950 the NAACP launched a series of lower court attacks on the separate-but-
equal doctrine as it applied to education. These cases were ultimately united before the
Supreme Court in Brown. Testimony by psychologists and sociologists was offered in
several of them. Dr. Kenneth B. Clark has prepared the following summary of this
testimony:
1. That racial segregation for the purposes of educational segregation was arbitrary
and irrelevant since the available scientific evidence indicates that there are no innate
racial differences in intelligence or other psychological characteristics. (Otto Kline-
berg-Wilmington trial) (Robert Redfield - South Carolina). This line of testimony
was consistently unchallenged by the attorneys for the states.
2. That contemporary social science interpretations of racial segregation indicate
that it blocks communication and increases mutual hostility and suspicion; it re-
inforces prejudices and facilitates rather than inhibits outbreaks of racial violence.
39 See their discussion of the sources. Id. at 139-51.
40 Deutscher & Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social
Science Opinion, 26 JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOoY 259 (1948).
41 Deutscher & Chein, op. cit. supra note 40.
42 Ibid. The Deutscher-Chein study while it has never been superseded has been supplemented.
The general area has been the subject of a recent book KARON, THE NEGRO PERsONALrry (1958),
which is reviewed in this issue. See also Hindeman, The Emotional Problems of Negro High School
Youths Which Are Related to Segregation and Discrimination in a Southern Urban Community, 27
JOURNAL OF EDUCATION SOCIOLOGY 115 (1953). Here, seventy-one percent of negro students ex-
amined (Miami, Florida) mentioned abolition of segregation as one of the three most desired changes
in their way of life. Exclusion, both public and private, was the second most frequently listed occasion
of unpleasant contacts with whites. The first was personal contact.
See Prothro & Smith, The Psychic Cost of Segregation, 15 PHYLON 393 (1954). The investigation
here claimed to have verified the propositions expressed by the Supreme Court in Brown. The
method employed was to measure the degree of authoritarianism in selected groups of whites
and negroes. Using the tests developed by Adorno in AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALrTY (1950), and
taking a score range of 7 maximum and 1 minimum, the mean score for 102 Negroes was 4.68 and
for 94 whites was 3.86. The authors expressed an opinion that the only factor which could be
identified as a cause was the southern pattern of segregation.
See also Weaver, Racial Sensitivity Among Negro Children, 17 PHYLON 52 (1956), a study based
on statements taken from negro school children on the incidents which led them to discover that
they were "Negroes." Most of the incidents involved social contacts, while some concerned schools
or public facilities.
See also Ausubel, Ego Development Among Segregated Negro Children, 42 MENTAL HYomN
362 (1958); Harlan, Psychiatric Aspects of School Segregation, 22 AmERicAN SOCIOLOxCAL RaVIEw
683 (1958).
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(David Krech - South Carolina, Jerome Brunner - Delaware, Brewster Smith,
Isadore Chein and Alfred MeClung Lee - Virginia).
3. That segregation has detrimental personality effects upon Negro children which
impair their ability to profit from the available education facilities. Segregation also
has certain complex and detrimental effects upon the personality and moral de-
velopment of white children. (Kenneth Clark - South Carolina, Delaware and
Virginia).
4. That the consequences of desegregation are in the direction of the improvement
of interracial relations and an increase in social stability. (Practically all the witnesses
in each case).
5. That, if non-segregation can work on the graduate and professional level, it can
work equally well on the elementary and high school level since children at this
stage of development are more flexible in their attitudes and behavior. (Mamie
Phipps Clark at Virginia).43
Note that the prophecy of Justice Harlan in Plessy, that laws effecting discrimination
would contribute to the impossibility of peace between the races, 44 is repeated by these
experts decades later.
Particularly interesting is the testimony in the Delaware cases concerning the
results of tests administered to the school children of the area involved. Dr. Frederick
Wertham, a psychiatrist, testified that in examining a group of negro students selected
at random he learned that they interpreted segregation "in one way only, as punish-
ment.' ' 45 Segregation, he found, produced an anxiety in these children which in turn
produced social disorientation. He specified that the fact of state enforcement intensified
the problem.
Dr. Clark testified 46 that, in a test administered to forty-one students of the
Wilmington negro high school, he had discovered damage to the self-esteem of the
Negro as a result of segregation, and he asserted that the findings were corroborated by
the results of tests conducted elsewhere. The lower court opinions under review in
Brown, insofar as they handle the validity of segregation per se, do so on the basis of
information such as this.
Chancellor Seitz of Delaware made a finding based on the psychological data and
conclusions put before him, concluding that the mental health and educational develop-
ment of negro children were adversely affected by state-enforced segregation.4 7 The
result of the segregated school system was an education for the Negro which was
substantially inferior to that provided for whites. Despite this finding, however, the
Chancellor declined to base his decision in the case on it, for the reason that such a
position would be inconsistent with the separate but equal doctrine. He reasoned that
the implications raised by the application of that doctrine in Gong Lum required
admitting the possibility of separate but equal facilities which meet constitutional re-
quirements. Thus, the evidence before the court to the effect that segregation is harm-
ful per se could not control the case as showing an inequality which violated
constitutional guarantees. While the Chancellor could and did hold that the existing
facilities for Negroes were not equal to those provided for whites, any change in the
separate but equal doctrine itself would have to come from the Supreme Court.48
43 Clark, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness in Civil Rights Litigation, 1 SocmAL PROBLEMS
5, 7 (1953).
44 See note 13, supra, and accompanying text.
45 N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1951, p. 8, col. 5.
46 N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1951, p. 27, col. 1. The test consisted of a choice by the students of which
of two dolls, one black and the other white, would most likely misbehave. The negro child picked
the black doll. Further testimony to this effect can be found reported in N.Y. Times, June 3, 1951,
§ 4, p. 7, col. 5 (experts in South Carolina), and id., Oct. 24, 1951, p. 36, col. 2 (Dr. Jerome
Bruner in Delaware). See also id., May 29, 1951, p. 27, col. 1; id., May 30, 1951, p. 12, col. 4
(testimony in Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951); and id., Feb. 27, 1952, p. 52, col.
3; Id., Feb. 29, 1952, p. 21, col. 2; id., Mar. 1, 1952, p. 30, col. 3 (testimony in Davis v. County
School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
47 Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 196, 87 A.2d 862 (1952).
48 Ibid.
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If the Court were to consider such a change, what would be some pertinent reasons
for adhering to the Gong Lum rule and refusing to apply the advanced-education
rationale to the lower-school situation? 49 Judge Parker in Briggs v. Elliott,0 the South
Carolina case, began his answer to that question with a reference to the "local problem"
rationale of Cumming. Graduate and professional schools, he argued, are designed to
train mature individuals who have made the decision to enter themselves. The expense
of maintaining separate schools, combined with the necessity of contact with other
students, does in fact make it virtually impossible to maintain equal facilities on a
segregated basis. On the other hand, grammar school education involves minors, who
are present in the schools under state compulsion. In its activity the elementary school
serves to supplement the training given to the child by its parents. Consequently, the
law must consider the wishes of the parent in formulating educational policy if it is to
enjoy the public support necessary for the existence of public education. 51 "The equal
protection of the laws does not require that the child must be treated as the property
of the state and the wishes of his family as to his upbringing be disregarded."152 The
weighing of the advantages of segregation is properly a legislative task. The judiciary
should not interfere, for its members have "no more right to read their ideas of
sociology into the Constitution than their ideas of economics." s
The results of the first round of litigation showed little definite progress toward a
new statement of the law. No court had found segregation to be invalid per se under
the law as it stood, although two of them had intimated that a change seemed immin-
ent.54 Only Delaware had found that there was such inequality in the existing facilities
that an end to segregation was immediately justified.55 One court found that the facilities
were equal, 56 and two more held that equality was being achieved and for that reason
refused to end segregation in the schools. 5 7 In the District of Columbia, relief had been
denied altogether.58
The Supreme Court viewed these cases as squarely raising the question of the
constitutionality of segregation in public education where the physical facilities provided
for the Negro were equal to those provided for whites. The Court held that "in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate-but-equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal." 59
How did the Court reach this conclusion? It employed the technique developed in
the professional cases: an examination of the nature and purpose of the educational
system in question, and a consideration of the effects of segregation on its goals -
considering education as a federal as well as a local problem. Chief Justice Warren, for
the majority, insisted, as had Judge Parker in Briggs, that the problem of education
49 The following arguments advanced by Justice Parker are substantially those advanced in the
Supreme Court in behalf of the Gong Lum rule by counsel, particularly John W. Davis. He argued
that the question was essentially a legislative one and that integrated education would lack public
support. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 42, col. 4. The weight of authority did not favor change.
Id., Dec. 11, 1952, p. 1, col. 3. A parent's wishes ought to be respected in the matter. Id., Dec. 11,
1952, p. 44, col. 3.
90 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
51 In the Virginia case, C. W. Darden, former governor of the state and then President of the
University of Virginia, testified that in his opinion the people would not support integrated education.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1952, p. 21, col. 2. The court in Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. Va. 1952), attached great weight to this statement in making its decision.
52 Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 536 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
53 Id. at 537.
54 Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 196, 87 A.2d 862 (1952); Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
55 Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137 (1952).
56 Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
57 Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), order aff'd 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C.
1952); Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).
58 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
99 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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must be considered in light of its place in our life today; whatever it may once have been
is of no importance. 60
He said:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments .... It is required for the performance of our most basic public responsibili-
ties. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today, it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later pro-
fessional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.61
Are segregated facilities inherently unequal? They had been found so on a graduate
and professional level, and the rationale of those cases was found to be even more
appropriate on the level of elementary education. Just as it had done in these earlier
cases, the Court again turned to the intangible factors which make segregated education
inherently unequal.
62
The extent to which the findings of sociologists as embodied in the expert testimony
in the lower courts was necessary to the disposition in Brown has been the subject of
a certain amount of debate. The Court did place some reliance on the findings which
had been made by the Kansas and Delaware courts on the basis of expert testimony.
It also referred in a footnote to a number of sociological texts as constituting "ample
modem authority" for its position.63 On the other hand, Professor Cahn argues that
the decision turns on the "common sense" of the Justices:
So one speaks in terms of the most familiar and universally accepted standards
of right and wrong when one remarks (1) that racial segregation under government
auspices inevitably inflicts humiliation, and (2) that official humiliation of innocent,
law-abiding citizens is psychologically injurious and morally evil. Mr. Justice Harlan
and many other Americans with responsive consciences recognized these simple
elementary propositions before, during, and after the rise of "separate but equal".
For at least twenty years hardly any cultivated person has questioned that segregation
is cruel to Negro school children. The cruelty is obvious and evident. Fortunately, it
is so very obvious that the Justices of the Supreme Court could see it and act on it
even after reading the labored attempts by plaintiffs' experts to demonstrate it
"scientifically."64
The language of the opinions seems to give Cahn's thesis a good deal of support.
Be that as it may, Brown held the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to outlaw segregation in the public schools per se. In a companion case, the court
60 The Court had propounded certain questions to counsel during the argument on what light
the history of the fourteenth amendment could throw on the issues before it. After hearing their
arguments, the Court found the information advanced to be inconclusive. This was due partly to
the fact that at the time of the adoption of the amendment public education was practically un-
known in the South, and the effect of the provision on northern education was not debated. Id. at
489-90.
61 Id. at 493.
62 Segregation of white and colored children in public schools, has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of
a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency
to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] in-
tegrated school system. Id. at 494.
68 347 U.S. at 495n. The authorities do support the propositions for which they are cited. How-
ever, only one of them, Deutscher & Chein, op. cit. supra note 40, is the result of original research.
Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?,
INT. 3. OPnioN AND ATrnDE RESEARiC 229 (1949), is a report of the same research, with some
interesting reflections on the validity of the method employed there. BRAMELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS IN
DIscDndmATION AND NATIONAL WEuFAR 44-48 (MacIver ed. 1949), and FRAzai, THE NEORO IN THE
UNrrE STATES 674-81 (1949), are undocumented, but the latter contains a bibliography of pre-
World War II texts. WrrMER & KoTNsxy, op. cit. supra note 31, and Clark, op. cit. supra note 43,
have already been discussed. The footnote in Brown closes with a general reference to MysnAL, AN
m CuAN DrpruMM (1944).64 Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150, 159 (1955).
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held segregation in the District of Columbia schools to violate the due process clause
of the fifth amendment since segregation "was not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective," 65 and thus deprived the Negro of his liberty as guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights.
The reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson by Brown did not purport to be complete. 66
The rationale of Brown had been written in terms of the educational systems and
problems that were before the Court, and the validity of legal segregation in the use of
other public facilities was still an open question. The extension of the Brown decision in-
to those fields was explored in several lower federal court cases shortly thereafter. The
most significant decision came from the Fourth Circuit in Dawson v. Baltimore.67 The
case involved segregation in the use of public beaches. Counsel for the city argued that
the separation of the races was necessary to maintain order. The court, however, reasoned
that since the necessity of maintaining order could not be interposed to segregate the
races in schools where attendance was compulsory, it could likewise not be invoked to
separate them where their use of the public facilities was voluntary. The Supreme
Court affirmed without opinion, 68 and also reversed a lower court decision 69 which had
sustained segregation in the use of a municipal golf course.70
In 1955 the Fourth Circuit considered a case involving a factual situation similar
to the one presented in Plessy - segregation in intra-state transportation. The court
held that since Plessy had been based on school cases it could have no validity after
Brown, and the segregation was forbidden.7 ' The reasoning employed was soon followed
by a district court in Alabama in Browder v. Gayle,72 which the Supreme Court
affirmed, again without opinion, citing Brown and the two cases discussed above. 78
The Brown case was the last occasion on which the Supreme Court found it
necessary to analyze the peculiar factual situation involved in order to strike down
legally enforced segregation where it was shown to exist. Hereafter the problems that
were to face the federal courts would lie in determining where such segregation did
exist and in devising remedies which could bring it to an end.
II IMPLEMENTATION
A. THE CONCEPT OF STATE ACTION
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment protected only against "state action."' While this doctrine has been criti-
cized,2 it seems firmly entrenched today. This section of the survey will concern itself
with the application of this doctrine in the area of race segregation.
The earliest form of state action to engage the attention of the Supreme Court
under the fourteenth amendment was the enactment of a law. In Strauder v. West Vir-
65 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
66 347 U.S. at 494-95.
67 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
68 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
69 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), afl'd. with directions, 223 F.2d
93 (5th Cir. 1955).
70 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
71 Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955).
72 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
73 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
1 109 U.S. 4 (1883). This case should be considered with the Court's decision in the Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), which gave a strict construction to the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
On the concept of state action see generally Abernathy, State Action, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375
(1958). The decision in the Civil Rights Cases was foreshadowed in United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875) and United States v. Dives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
2 The argument has been made that these decisions frustrated the intent of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment. See SCHNIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN FEDERAL
STATE RELATIONS, 1789-1957, p. 99 (1958); 2 CROSSKY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1083-1158
(1953); Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 303 (1959).
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ginia,8 a Negro convicted of murder successfully challenged the constitutionality of a
West Virginia statute which declared that only white males were eligible to serve as jurors.
The Supreme Court placed on the fourteenth amendment a basic construction that has
remained to the present time. The amendment says "no state shall . . . deny to any
person ... the equal protection of the laws;" by enacting and enforcing a statute dis-
criminating against a person on the basis of race, a state is denying such equal pro-
tection.4 Simultaneously, the Court, through dictum in another jury exclusion case,
elaborated more fully the principle that "state action" embraces acts by legislative,
executive and judicial authorities and that the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment
extends to all such action. 5
Where the discrimination the individual complains of is inflicted without specific
statutory approval, the problem becomes the more difficult one of deciding whether
there is in some other way6 sufficient presence of the state in its legislative, executive, or
judicial capacities to mark the discriminatory act as attributable to state, rather than to
private, action. The initial division of the problem will be made among situations in-
volving a) actions of state officials and agencies, b) actions of quasi-public agencies
exercising functions under some degree of control by the state, c) actions of individuals
which can be reached because they are made possible by state inaction.
1. Actions of State Officers.
If an official who has a clear and direct connection with the state orders or puts
into effect actions which violate individual rights existing under state law, the individual
may theoretically be able to seek redress under the laws of the state, but often
must find his remedy in federal judicial and legislative relief under the fourteenth
amendment. The presence of state action in this situation is more difficult to find than
in earlier cases where the action was expressly authorized by state law. In Virginia v.
Rives,7 a state judge, on his own initiative, had excluded Negroes from jury service even
though the state statute made all males over 21 eligible for such service. The judge was
prosecuted under a federal criminal statutes which made it a misdemeanor for any
officer charged with the duty of selecting jurors to exclude citizens qualified under law
from jury duty because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The con-
stitutionality of the federal statute was upheld under section five of the fourteenth
amendment on the grounds that when one who is clothed with state power acts in the
name of the state, his actions are those of the state.
This situation is not entirely similar to that which exists when state agents or
officials are clearly violating state laws because the judge in this case was vested with
a certain amount of discretion. The state law merely instructed him to select jurors
and did not specifically instruct him to select both colored and white jurors. The Court
in applying the state action test reasoned that a state could not escape the restriction
3 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
4 In view of these considerations the fourteenth amendment was framed and adopted.
It was designed to assure the colored race enjoyment of all the civil rights the same
that are enjoyed under law by white persons and to give them the protection of the
federal government, so that that enjoyment would not be denied by the state.
100 U.S. at 306-08.
5 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). In this case however, the Court found the removal
action premature under the particular statute involved. The opinion in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 347 (1879) states:
The constitutional provision therefore must mean that no agency of the state or of
its officers or agents by whom its powers are executed shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
6 The question of state action is not difficult when a state agency is clearly involved. Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1896). For any unit operating under
express authority of the state or through delegation of state power is expressly engaged in state
action. Abernathy, supra note 1, at 378.
7 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
8 Rev. Stat. §§ 1977, 1978 (1875).
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of the Constitution by placing discretionary power in the hands of an official. The Court
placed emphasis on the constitutional purposes and the need to prevent frustration of
these purposes.
An analagous result was reached in Raymond v. Chicago Traction CoY where the
Supreme Court struck down excessive tax assessments by a State Board of Equalization
against a corporation. Even though the action of the board was not authorized under the
laws and constitution of Illinois, the Court found "state action," on the basis of the
difficulty in obtaining redress in the state courts. This approach would seem to have
legitimate value in those situations where there is an existing state remedy but the
individual would be forced to pursue a long and possibly fruitless tour through the
state agencies or courts.
In cases such as those involving police brutality, the problem is more difficult as
the action complained of is clearly violative of state law. Such a case was presented by
Screws v. United States,'Oa decided in 1945. There the offense could have been punished
under applicable state law but it is doubtful whether there was any real intention to
bring state criminal proceedings against the defendant. Screws, a Georgia sheriff, and
three others, had taken Robert Hall, a Negro charged with tire theft, into custody.
Upon arrival at the courthouse, Hall was brutally beaten by the four men and died as a
result of the injuries inflicted. The four were indicted under the Federal Civil Rights
Actl0b for depriving Hall of his constitutional rights under color of law, more specifical-
ly, the right to be tried by due process of law, and not to be deprived of life without due
process of law. The Court rejected the argument that the federal statute as construed
was unconstitutional.
The importance of this case for our present purposes is found in the Court's expan-
sion of the concept of state action. The Court reasoned that since the defendants were
officers of the law, and since the assault had arisen out of an effort to make an arrest
effective, they had operated under color of state law."
The Screws case and cases like it seem to present a legitimate application of the
principle of state action. When an officer makes an arrest or engages in the performance
of a state function, the individual against whom the action is directed knows that the offi-
cer represents the state. The individual is not in the same position as he is when being
assaulted by a private citizen, even though the officer is flagrantly overstepping his
authority. The actions, though in excess of authority, are clearly the direct result of
the state's giving the officer the duties to perform and vesting its official power of the
state in the officer. It cannot be maintained either by the rules of agency law or
realistically by theories of constitutional policy that state participation in the acts of an
official ends the instant the official violates state law.
The concept developed in Screws was further extended in Crews v. United States,'
2
where the defendant, a municipal police officer, was convicted of violating a Negro's
constitutional rights by beating him and later causing his death by forcing him to jump
into a river and drown. The defense asserted that the defendant had a personal
9 207 U.S. 21 (1907) See also Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913).
10a 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
10b 18 U.S.C. 320 (1952).
11 Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it. If, as suggested,
the statute was designed to embrace only action which the State in fact authorized,
the words "under color of any law" were hardly apt words to express the idea.
325 U.S. at 111.
While the Supreme Court did find the requisite state action in the conduct of the officers, the case
was reversed for a defect in the instructions to the jury. The Court held that it was necessary that
there be a willful intent to violate the victim's constitutional rights.
While Screws was acquitted on his retrial, the Court in Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1950)
upheld the conviction of a special police officer under the Civil Rights Acts. See generally Abernathy,
State Action, 43 CoRNBLL L.Q. 375, 381 (1958).
12 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947).
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animosity toward his victim based on a long-standing quarrel between them; since the
defendant had acted out of personal malice, his action could not be considered state
action. The jury in the lower court, however, found that the defendant acted under color
of law in the course of his duties as a municipal officer and the court of appeals
affirmed. It appears, then, that brutality by a policeman while on duty can be a
criminal violation of constitutional rights even though the relationship to his duties is,
to say the least, ambiguous.
13
It is possible, however, for a police officer to act in an entirely private capacity.
In Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club,14 a civil action was brought against a sheriff,
his deputy and a racing club on the grounds that the three parties had conspired to
deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
After paying his admission and entering the race park, the plaintiff was conducting
himself in a lawful manner, when he was forced to leave by a deputy sheriff who was
employed by the club. The deputy, who was known to the plaintiff as such, had
threatened to place plaintiff under arrest if he did not leave.
The district court found that, even though the deputy's actions in removing the
plaintiff from the premises may have constituted false imprisonment and arrest, they
were of the same nature as those any other agent of the club could have performed.
Despite the fact the deputy was a state officer, his actions were done purely in the
capacity of his private employment and could not constitute a violation of constitutional
rights.
2. Activities Under State Auspices.
It is now clear that any activity directly carried on by a state or its political sub-
divisions is "state action," within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Thus it
has been consistently held that state or municipal recreational facilities must be open
to Negroes on the same basis as whites,' 5 even though for purposes of tort law these
may be characterized as "proprietary" rather than "governmental" functions. 10
Where activities of this kind are carried out by private agencies under some kind of
state auspices, the holdings have been less unanimous. In Derrington v. Plummer,1
7 the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court order enjoining Harris County, Texas, from extend-
ing a lease of a courthouse cafeteria to tenants who excluded Negroes. The county's
connection with the cafeteria was that of a lessor who supplied the premises and
utilities to private parties who operated the restaurant. The court held that because of
the facilities supplied by the county, the public funds used and the public purpose of
the building and the cafeteria, the action of the lessee was the same as the action of
the county and therefore state action. The injunction ordered the county not to lease
unless specific assurance were included that equal facilities would be made available to
Negroes and further ordered the tenant himself in 90 days to stop excluding Negroes. The
implications of, this case are far reaching in that the court seems to hold that if a state
13 A case to be discussed later in connection with state inaction holds that an officer may
violate the constitution by intentionally allowing a mob to assault a person in his presence. Catlette
v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
14 86 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1949). An analogous result was reached under the fifth amend-
ment in Mitchell v. Boys Club, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.C. 1957). See 3 RAcE REL. L. RaP. 252 (1958),
also Roak v. West, 251 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1958); Simmons v. Whitaker, 252 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1958).
15 Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1956); Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam. 350 U.S. 877
(1955). New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Petiege, 252 F. 2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958). See
also several older cases decided in the "separate but equal" era. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D. W.Va. 1948); Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951). Kansas City v. Williams,
205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953). See also Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958) where the
maintenance of segregated voting registration offices was enjoined.
16 A state cannot by judicial decision or otherwise, remove any of its activities from
the inhibitions of the fourteenth amendment. It is doubtful whether a municipality
may ever engage in purely private action that would not be action of the state.
City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 1956).
17 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
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attempts to divest itself of certain activities, the individuals acting in its place may be
subject to injunction.
On the other hand, in Tonkins v. Greensboro,'s negro citizens were not allowed to
enjoin the city from disposing of a city owned swimming pool in order to avoid the
necessity of desegregating it. The court conceded that the city could not operate a
segregated pool, but concluded that because the city was under no obligation to operate
a swimming pool, the city could dispose of it. The opinion hinted that if any attempt
were made to lease the pool or to sell it in collusion with the future lessee or owners in
order to promote segregation, a different result would be reached.
The problem raised by private agencies performing more or less public func-
tions under some kind of public auspices is particularly complex in the field of public
housing. In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.,19 decided in 1949, the City of New York
had contracted with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the development of
a housing project. The project was to be operated by Metropolitan's wholly owned
subsidiary, Stuyvesant Town Corporation. The land used in the project was acquired by
the city through the exercise of its powers of eminent domain. Stuyvesant then pur-
chased the land from the city, assuming all costs of construction. The terms of the
contract provided a tax exemption for 25 years and the city reserved the right to main-
tain rent regulation and to control any further sale or mortgage of the property.
20
Stuyvesant Corporation, according to a plan made known to the city before the
contract was entered into, operated the completed housing project on a segregated basis.
As a result of this policy, plaintiffs, members of the negro race, were refused admission.
The action was brought alleging violation of the state constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
These contentions were rejected by the New York Court of Appeals, which held
that there was not sufficient state action to invoke the fourteenth amendment because the
public nature of the project had ended when the corporation assumed control according
to the contract.
The state court discussed the applicable cases which had arisen under the fourteenth
amendment, but held that the Dorsey situation did not meet even an extended definition
of the term "state action." The extension contended for was that such action should
include acts of discrimination by private individuals if such acts of discrimination
had been aided by or made possible by the state. The court reasoned that the public
purpose of a housing project was complete when the state had initiated the rehabilitation
of the area and since the state had taken no part in the discrimination, no state action
was present. The court felt that:
• . . to say that . . . helpful cooperation between the State and the respondent
(Housing Corporation) transforms the activities of the latter into State Action,
comes perilously close to asserting that any State assistance to an organization
that discriminates necessarily violates the fourteenth amendment.21
While it is still a valid question to ask how the Supreme Court might rule in a
case similar to Dorsey,22 a large number of lower federal court and state court opinions
indicate that racial segregation in a public housing project is unconstitutional. 23
18 162 F. Supp. 549 (N.D.N.C. 1958).
19 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). See Note, Is There a
Civil Right to Housing Accomodations?, 33 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 463 (1958).
20 87 N.E.2d at 550.
21 87 N.E.2d at 551. The so-called Wicks-Austin Bill, N.Y. CIvIL RIGHT STAT. § 18 (Supp. 1957)
substantially reversed the effect of the Dorsey case. Similarly New York City abolished discrimination
in Public Housing. NEw YoRK Crry, N.Y., LocAL .LAw No. 41 (1951).
22 See Note, Is There a Civil Right to Housing Accomodations?, 33 Nom-s D . LAw. 463,
468-76 (1958).
23 E.g., Seawell v. MacWhithey, 2 NJ. Super. 116, 63 A.2d 309 (1949); Bank v. Housing
Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Detroit
Housing Comm'n v. Lewes, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Cohen v. Public Housing Authority, 257
F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958) (dictum).
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The carrying out of private dispositions by state agencies - as in the area of
charitable trusts - presents another area of controversy. In 1837, a philanthropist had
left a trust fund to the city of Philadelphia for the purpose of maintaining a school
for the benefit of poor, white, male orphans. Negro children who had been denied
admission because of their failure to qualify under the trust terms, brought an action for
admittance in the state court against the city trustee in charge of administering the
school. Both the lower court2 4 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 25 refused to admit
the children. The United States Supreme Court found that the administration of the
school by the city constituted state action, regardless of the fact that the discrimination
was dictated by terms of the private trust instrument, and under the Brown rationale
reversed and remanded.26 On remand, the Pennsylvania court did not order an integrated
school, but instead allowed the creation of a new Board of Trustees who had no
relation to the city. This action was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court27
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 28 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court relied on the fact that the trust created a private charitable bequest and held that
although the control exercised by the trustees constituted state action, their removal
would satisfy constitutional objections.
Concerning state action, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had pointed out that a
will is without force if it is not probated and that state law is necessary to effectuate any
will. If this was state action, no private charity created by a will could dispose of its
benefits on the basis of race, creed, or color as its settlor had stipulated. The court,
therefore, rejected the implication that objectionable state action could be present
whenever the state allowed probate of a will. This reasoning should be evaluated in the
light of the holding in Shelley v. Kraemer29 -80 that a state court cannot constitutionally
enforce a racially restrictive covenant in a deed.
The fact of state financial support of private institutions creates a problem in
determining state action. This consideration was of great importance in Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library,31 decided in 1945, in which a Negro was awarded damages and an
injunction because she was refused admission to a city library's training classes. The
library had been founded by a private individual who created a trust fund and donated
property for the library, though it required public funds to continue operation. No
provision was made in the trust instrument for racial discrimination. The trustees were
appointed under a Maryland statute and had all title to and control of the property.
The Fourth Circuit held that the operation of the library constituted state action.
The court holding was based on the control by the city and the fact that the city's
appropriations were necessary to accomplish the library purpose. The public purpose
of the library was an important factor in this case. This case is distinguishable from
Girard, where segregation reflected the settlor's policy, whereas here it was existing by
virtue of city policy.
A different result was reached in Norris v. Baltimore, 2 a 1948 case involving a
private art institute. The federal district court found no state action in spite of numerous
financial appropriations that were made to the institute. The court was undoubtedly in-
fluenced by the lack of direct control by the city over the operation and policies of the
school.
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The problem of segregated transportation facilities demonstrates another aspect of
the state participation necessary to constitute state action. These facilities are often con-
trolled by private corporations. However, to the extent that these corporations are acting
24 Re Application of William Foust, 4 PA. D.&C.2d 677, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 340 (1956).
25 In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).
26 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of the City Trust, 353 U.S. 230 (1956).
27 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
28 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
29-30 340 U.S. 1 (1948).
31 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 72 (1945).
32 78 F. Supp. 451 (D.Md. 1948).
33 Abernathy, State Action, 43 CoRNELL LQ. 375, 391 (1958).
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pursuant to the mandates of state regulatory authorities, state action is found. The 1958
case of Baldwin v. Morgan3 4 involved a railroad terminal in Birmingham where city and
state authorities required segregation to be maintained. An action for damages and in-
junction was brought under the Civil Rights Statute35 and the fourteenth amendment
charging the city, the Public Service Commission, and the terminal authority with dis-
crimination against the negro race.
There was no question that the city and the commission were acting under color
of law even though a misuse of authority may have existed. Concerning the Terminal
Company, the Court stated that it was assisting in carrying out the unlawful action by
maintaining the segregated terminal and therefore its action would be classified as state
action. Once again an important factor in the determination of state action was that the
private person was reflecting state policy - the Court stated;
... since a private person or party "*-* * takes its character from the duties imposed
by state statutes; the duties do not become a matter of private law because they are
performed by * * "a private person .. 36
The area of control and regulation of primary elections presents similar problems
of private agencies carrying out public functions. If the state runs the election, be it
primary or general, there is no problem;37 but primary elections conducted by political
parties have presented a difficult question. The Supreme Court, however, has extended
the state action concept to meet the situation by relying on the theory of public purpose
or function to override the technical difference between state and private agencies.
These cases have, for the most part, arisen in the southern states, where political
parties exclude members of the negro race. Since the primaries conducted by the
Democratic Party generally control the general elections, the Supreme Court has been
quick to see that discrimination in a primary seriously restricts the Negro's constitutional
right to vote.
In Nixon v. Herndon3 8 and Nixon v. Condon,39 the Court found state action in the
conduct of the political party which regulated the primary election. The Condon court
stated:
The test is not whether they are to be classified as representatives of the State in
the strict sense in which an agent is the representative of his principal. The test is
whether they are to be classified as representatives of the State to such an extent
and in such a sense that the restraints of the Constitution set limits to their action.40
This is a broad test putting emphasis on the nature of the act rather than the control by
the state, and even though the courts in these cases were strongly influenced by the
delegation to the political party of power previously exercised by the state, the applica-
bility of the broad test is demonstrated by the subsequent cases.
In Rice v. Elmore4l all state statutes regarding primary elections had been repealed
and still the Court found state action. This decision was based on the result of discrim,
ination in the primary elections in question. Private individuals, by the control they exer-
cised over these primaries, were able to deprive the Negro of the right to cast a useful
vote in the general election. To say that this was not state action would be to frustrate
completely the constitutional protections.
42
The line of cases on political parties and negro voting rights was climaxed, and
possibly ended, by Terry v. Adams. 43 In this case, a political club which barred Negroes
from membership made it a practice to hold its own primary election before the state-
established party primary. Since the winner of the private primary would normally win
34 251 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958).
35 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952); 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952).
For a discussion of these acts see pp. 760-61 infra.
36 251 F.2d at 790.
37 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1940).
38 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
39 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
40 Id. at 89.
41 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 875 (1948).
42 Smith v. Albright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
43 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
STUDENT ANALYSIS
the regular primary and the general election, the Court found state action. This finding
seems to be based on result rather than on actual action. The effect of the practice
was a denial, for all practical purposes of the Negroes' voting right. Since the state
should be protecting this right, and should be conducting a meaningful primary, the
Court took the position that the actions of the club were the same as the actions of the
state. When a function so directly related to the nature of a state is completely assumed
by a private group and a valuable political right seriously infringed, to deny the existence
of state action would be to nullify the constitutional guarantee.
3. Inaction by the State
The word "action" is defined as "an act; a deed; a thing done; enterprise," 44 and
it is this ordinary connotation that is usually applicable in describing constitutionally
objectionable state action. For example, a state acts by passing a statute,45 by beating
citizens, 46-47 by enforcing a realty covenant. 48 However, a broad connotation of the
term could also include "the act of not doing something," and in this sense the acts of
failing to protect citizens from brutality,4 9 of refusing to place citizens on jury rolls.50
The semantic pursuit of distinctions between action and inaction on this level
seems of minimal value when the reflection is made that the essence of unconstitution-
ality is discrimination, which term necessarily contemplates both action and inaction
co-existing in one siutation. For example, under the old separate but equal doctrine
as applied to education, unconstitutionality ultimately could rest upon a failure to
provide equal facilities for Negroes even though this would depend on the state's act of
providing educational facilities in the first place. 5' State "inaction," however, can be
predicated not only on the state's failure to treat equally under the rights and the laws
it has created, but also of the state's failure to provide laws protecting citizens from
the harms of private individuals.52 In either sense, cases concerned with "state inaction"
apparently represent the crumbling edges of the concept "state action" as it has been
implied in the prohibition that "No State . .. shall . .. deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 58
Police brutality, as we have seen, fits within the concept of state action even though
the activity is illegal under state law.5 4 It does not take much constitutional imagination
to include also the situation where, by "inaction" police officials intentionally allow
persons to be harmed by mob violence. In Catlette v. United States5 5 in 1943, a deputy
sheriff was found to be acting under color of law when he organized a mob to inflict
indignities on a group of Jehovah's Witnesses, even though he took off his badge and
stated "What is done from here on will not be done in the name of the law."56 And al-
though there were no specific provisions in the state constitution or statutes making his
actions illegal, the court took judicial notice of the common law duty of a sheriff to
protect persons from assault in his presence. Similarly in Lynch v. United States57 in
44 WEBSTRs NEW INT. DIcT. (2d ed. 1953).
45 Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
46-47 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
48 Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948).
49 Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951).
50 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
51 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); cf. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
52 See Morse, Policy and the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Semantics, 27 FORDHAm L. REV.
187 (1958); Horowitz, The Misleading Search For "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
30 So. Cm. L. Rav. 208 (1957); Note, The Disintegration of a Concept: State Action Under the 14th
and 15th Amendments, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 402 (1948).
58 U.S. CONsT. Amend. XIV, § 1.
54 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
55 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943); cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
56 132 F.2d at 904.
57 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951).
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1951, a sheriff and deputy sheriff were convicted for turning over negro prisoners to a
Ku Klux Klan mob, the court stating:
There was a time when the denial of equal protection of the law was confined to
affirmative acts, but the law now is that culpable inaction may also be a denial of
equal protection.58
The question is whether the existence of a duty to act on the part of a single police
officer can be made the basis for relief against state inaction on a larger scale, and
especially whether, in either case, federal injunctions, prosecutions, and damages can be
made to operate against the individuals proximately responsible, rather than the state
officials who failed to act. Wherever federal remedies are made available to protect
against the acts of private individuals, no matter what the theory, there is a departure
from the strict concepts established in the Civil Rights Cases.
Indications of this are present in many of the cases previously discussed. In
Shelley v. Kraemer, 9 the nullification of the state's policy of enforcing racially restric-
tive covenants operated with direct effect on private individuals who used "neutral" state
law to engage in discrimination. In the primary election cases, the injunctive remedies
were used against private groups because they had assumed a function so completely
attributable to the state that they were acting in place of the state and could be made
subject to the same sanctions as state officials. Again in the case involving the lease of
the courthouse cafeteria, part of the court order operated directly against the private
lessee on the same theory. In all these instances, the state's duty actively to curtail dis-
crimination began to emerge as the basis for giving relief against individual activity.
Another indication of the breakup of the concept of state action is the degree to
which court orders operating against the state are being used in contravention of the
principle that the federal power cannot force the states to correct evils outside the area
of activity they have undertaken to deal with. In Holloyd v. Board of Public Instruc-
tion,60 the findings are not clear as to whether school district lines had been artfully
drawn to maintain segregation, or responded to a pronounced natural geographical
division between the white and negro sections of the community as to allow it. With-
out reversing the district court finding that the school district had not been deliberately
gerrymandered, the Fifth Circuit started with the fact of a segregated public school,
concluded unconstitutional state action, and ordered integration. Also, the attempt to set
up three schools, 61 one white, one Negro and one integrated met with similar defeat,
despite the theory that any resulting discrimination would be private. These examples
indicate that present constitutional theory does not allow a state to disclaim the re-
sponsibility for segregation in public schools because that segregation is produced by
forces it does not undertake to deal with.
Brewer v. Hoxie School District62 illustrates the fact that there are possible situations
in which the rights of citizens may be protected against individual action. The Eighth
Circuit held that a local school board could obtain an injunction against a group of
private individuals who were interfering with the school board's attempt at integration.
The court's jurisdiction and the cause of action under federal statutes were founded in
the federal duty of the school board to uphold the constitution and the corollary federal
right to be free from interference in executing that duty. The court thus sidestepped the
issue of state action by bringing the case into an area where the constitution protects
against individual action. However, the court went on to find additional grounds for the
cause of action in the fact that the school board was in loco parentis asserting the negro
childrens' right to equal protection of the law. But with the same breath the court ad-
mitted that any rights in the Negroes standing alone existed against state action alone.
The court gave only a cryptic, unsatisfactory answer to this apparent contradiction:
... if defendant's illegal conduct succeeds in coercing the school board to rescind
its desegregation order, such recission can be accomplished only through "state action."
68 Id. at 479.
59 344 U.S. 1 (1948).
60 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
61 Kelley v. Board of Educ. 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
62 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1958).
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The school board having the duty to afford the children the equal protection of the
law has the correlative right, as has been pointed out, to protection in performance
of its function. Its right is thus intimately identified with the right of the children
themselves. The right does not arise solely from the interest of the parties concerned,
but from the necessity of government itself.63
4. Conclusion
The development of the legal concept of state action has varied according to the
factual situation in which the issue arises. In situations where the state is patently
in control, state action is often found by principles analogous to those of agency law.
Therefore it was not difficult for the courts to find state action whenever the activity
was directed by the state, involved state officers who exceeded their authority or who
acted under their own discretion. Under this approach, it becomes irrelevant whether the
function involved is governmental or proprietary.
However, the tests of control become difficult of application when both the state
and private groups join together to achieve goals thought to be good in the community.
Here the courts must evaluate the degree of control held by the state, the amount of
state financial assistance to the operation of the activity, and the relationship of the
activity to public purposes. The courts search to find the presence of the state, and if
the state's presence is sufficiently noticeable its passivity in allowing discrimination to
exist in the area of the activity will be made the basis for concluding that there is
state as well as private discrimination.
Other considerations arise when the state completely removes itself from the
activity and relinquishes all control to private individuals. Though the ordinary elements
of state action are not present, if the activity is sufficiently intermingled with the
necessities of government, the private control will be made equivalent to state action.
The decisions seem to have established a hierarchy of rights in relation to which the
Court is willing to expand or contract the concept of state action. Political rights and
physical security have ranked high. Rights in public education now seem established
temporarily as of prime importance above the related rights in housing, transportation,
recreational facilities, and economic opportunities. Wherever public education is in-
volved the court will use the most liberal test possible in order to determine state action.
In Cooper v. Aaron,64 the Court forbade the states to use governmental powers barring
children from school because of race by any arrangement. Any is the vital word. The
importance of a broad understanding of the term "state action" is therefore necessary
in evaluating the constitutionality of the imaginative attempts by the southern states
to avoid the decision in Brown. For if any state departs from a system of public
education in order to uphold segregation, any support given to private school systems
by the state will have to undergo the oft-repeated query: is it discriminatory state action?
B. JUDICIAL DECREES
1. Procedure
Suits in the federal courts to compel desegregation of public schools are governed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in order to understand more fully
the disposition of such suits certain procedural problems peculiar to these suits should
be considered.
Since segregation is a group phenomenon aimed at a clearly ascertainable segment
of society,6 5 most suits to compel desegregation are brought in the form of class
63 238 F.2d at 104.
64 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
65 In Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C.), afl'd per curiam, 350 U.S.
979 (1955) it was argued that a suit by three negro youths could not be maintained as a class action.
The court, however, stated that: "The action in this instance is within the provisions of Rule 23(a)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the attitude of the university affects the rights of all
Negro citizens of the State who are qualified for admission to the undergraduate schools." 134 F.
Supp. at 593. See generally, Comment, The Class Action in Anti-Segregation Cases, 20 U. CM. L.
Rnv. 577 (1953).
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actions. 66 There seems to be little doubt that the use of the class action device is proper
especially since the suits passed on in Brown were all brought in the form, of class
actions,67 and the lower courts since Brown have been unanimous in approving the
use of the class action in such suits.68
Where relief by interlocutory or permanent injunction is sought in a federal district
court to restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of any state statute or ad-
ministrative order on the grounds that it is violative of the United States Constitution,
convening of a three-judge district court is required by statute. 69 Expeditious review,
by direct appeal to the Supreme Court, is afforded irrespective of the outcome.
70 Sub-
sequent to Brown (where all the federal cases had been heard by three-judge courts), the
district courts have on many occasions been requested to convene three-judge courts
to determine the validity of state constitutional provisions or statutes requiring the
maintenance of segregated schools. In general, such requests have been unsuccessful.
In some cases the denial was based on a finding that the decision of the Brown case re-
moved any substantial constitutional issue and any state law requiring segregated edu-
cational facilities is clearly invalid.7 ' In other cases three-judge courts were not con-
vened because the defendants conceded the unconstitutionality of the assailed statute,
72
or the plaintiff sought to enjoin discriminatory actions of state officials rather than
to attack the statute as unconstitutional. 73 This device will probably be employed only
infrequently in future desegregation suits.
The federal district courts, in ruling on requests to order desegregation in a public
school system, are faced with the more difficult procedural problem of what state and
local administrative remedies must be exhausted before a plaintiff is entitled to equitable
relief. This problem has become increasingly important with the passage of many pupil-
assignment laws in the southern states.74 Closely allied with this question is that of the
proper function of the school authorities who have been charged with the primary re-
sponsibility for implementing the constitutional requirement of a desegregated public
school system.
75
Exhaustion of state and local administrative remedies, if the remedies are not
provided by a statute unconstitutional on its face and are not in some other manner
inadequate, has generally been held a prerequisite to federal intervention in school
desegregation cases. 76 Where exhaustion is required, fairly strict compliance with the
administrative procedures seems necessary. In Carson v. Warlick,77 an "en masse"
66 Class actions in the federal courts are governed by FED. R. Cxv. p. 23(b).
67 Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
68 Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957);
Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938
(1957); Frazier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S.
979 (1955).
69 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, 2284 (1952).
70 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1952).
71 Booker v. Tennessee Bd. of Educ., 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957);
Covington v. Montgomery County School Bd., 139 F. Supp. 161 (M.D.N.C. 1956); Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1956).
72 Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 1955); Kelley v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp.
578 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
73 School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957). See generally Comment, 36 TEXAs L. RaV.
812 (1958).
74 See pp. 768-73, infra.
75 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
76 Carson v. Board of Educ., 227 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955), 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957) (N.C.); Robinson v. Board of Educ., 143 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md.
1956); Moore v. Board of Educ., 146 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1956); Ward v. Regents, 2 RACE REL.
L. REe. 369 (N.D. Ga. 1957); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
But see Kelley v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), in which the court, in the
alternative, held exhaustion irrelevant since the relief was "not merely to obtain assignment to
particular schools but, in addition, to have a system of compulsory segregation declared uncon-
stitutional."
77 238 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); but see School Bd. v. Allen,
240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
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administrative appeal on behalf of a number of negro children who had unsuccessfully
completed the first step of their administrative remedy was held not to amount to
exhaustion where individual appeals were required. In Holt v. Raleigh City Board
of Educ.78 the plaintiffs' failure to appear personally at a hearing required under a
pupil placement law, although they were represented by counsel at the hearing, caused
the district court to dismiss for failure to exhaust the applicable administrative remedies.
The federal courts in dealing with the exhaustion requirement have given the
administrative remedies in question a rigorous examination. 79 Thus, resort to the pupil
assignment laws of Louisiana s0 and Virginia8 l has been held unnecessary because of the
inadequacy of the administrative remedies provided.82 The Fifth Circuit in Orleans
Parish School Bd. v. Bush83 held that the Louisiana statute lacked an "ascertainable
standard" to guide officials in placing school children. The court felt the lack of a
standard, in light of past practices in Louisiana, "implied as its only basis.., for place-
ment the prohibited standard of race."'8 4 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Atkins v.
School Bd.8 5 found that the Virginia statute failed to provide adequate standards to
guide the local officials. Both opinions viewed the statutes in question in the context of
their legislative histories and in conjunction with associated statutes, and pointed out
the futility of requiring a litigant to pursue an administrative remedy when the final
success would be rewarded by the closing of the school pursuant to other legislation.
Further, the administrative remedies have been found fatally defective where they
would be too time-consuming to furnish adequate relief. This ground was relied on in
Atkins, where the court found that it could take as much as 105 days to pursue the
administrative remedy to a final determination, and in Thompson v. County School Bd.,8 6
where the court termed the provided remedy "too sluggish and prolix to constitute a
reasonable remedial process." Thus, the administrative remedy must actually be capable
of resulting in an education in the school applied for, beginning reasonably soon after the
administrative machinery is set in motion.
The policy of the local school authorities regarding desegregation is gaining promin-
ence as a justification for short-circuiting local administrative processes. Several courts
have held that it would serve no useful purpose to require negro students to seek
relief from a school board, or even to apply for admission to any particular school,
before seeking a court desegregation order, in the face of a practice or policy of the
local school authorities to maintain a segregated school system.8 7-90 These cases all in-
volved an announced board policy to this effect, but it may be that such an open stand
would not be required.
Somewhat akin to the problem of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that of
exhaustion of state judicial remedies, or equitable abstention. All of the pupil assign-
ment laws9 1 provide for appeals to state courts, but these have been held judicial,
78 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
79 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd. 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); Atkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.Va.),
afl'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Gibson v. Board of Public Instruc-
tion, 246 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1957); Kelley v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
80 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81.1 (Supp. 1956).
81 Acrs VA. 1956. Ex. Sess., C. 70.
82 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); Atkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430 E.D. Va.), aff'd,
246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
88 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
84 Id. at 165.
85 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
86 159 F.Supp. 567, 568 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 252 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
958 (1958).
87-90 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), afl'd, 242 F.2d 156
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction, 246 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1957);
Kelley v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
91 See pp. 768-73, infra.
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rather than administrative, remedies. 92 While a federal court has occasionally abstained
from granting equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional state statutes in this
general area on the ground that construction by a state court first may avoid the con-
stitutional issue,93 plaintiffs in school desegregation cases have not been required to seek
redress in the state judiciary before requesting the aid of a federal court. In reversing a
district court which had applied the doctrine of equitable abstention to a school desegre-
gation case on the groud that the conduct complained of was also contrary to state law
forbidding segregation in public education, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the
"obvious purpose" in vesting civil rights jurisdiction in the federal courts was to enable
members of a minority to be heard in a forum presided over by an appointed federal
judge rather than an elected state judge.9 4 The same result was reached when this
argument was presented as one of comity in a bus segregation case, the court stating
that the responsibility of the federal courts to protect civil rights is as great as that of
the state courts.9 5 With desegregation in public education now firmly established as a
civil right, there is little likelihood that equitable abstention will receive much attention
in this area.
2. Scope
The Supreme Court, in its second opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ.,9 6 recognized
the widely varying situations to which the principle of desegregation in the schools
would be applied. Accordingly, considerable leeway was permitted regarding the man-
ner in which this principle was to be enforced in practice. Primary responsibility was
conferred upon the school authorities; the courts were to insure that it was exercised in
good faith. The courts were to exercise a practical flexibility in eliminating obstacles in
a systematic and effective manner, but were to require that a prompt and reasonable
start be made. These governing principles were not to yield merely because of disagree-
ment with them. After such a start, and if the school authorities were to show its
necessity, additional time might be granted to overcome administrative problems. These
problems might concern the school plant, transportation system, personnel, or the re-
vision of attendance districts and local laws and regulations. The lower courts were to
retain jurisdiction during the transition from a segregated to an nonsegregated school
system insuring that it be brought about with all deliberate speed.9 7
Local school authorities are primarily responsible for effecting desegregation in the
public schools, but even if they are wholeheartedly accepting this responsibility, plain-
tiffs aggrieved by a segregated school system are entitled to have a federal district court
take jurisdiction and watch over the transition from start to finish. District courts have
occasionally dismissed desegregation cases upon a finding that local authorities were
already proceeding towards a good faith implementation of Brown, but such dismissals
have uniformly been reversed. 98 While it may be within the lower court's discretion to
92 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), afl'd, 242 F.2d 156
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
93 Smith v. Faubus, 2 RAcE RE.. L. RaP. 1103 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
94 Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1955), reversing 131 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.
Cal.).
95 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 713 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
96 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
97 Id. at 299-301.
98 Bell v. Rippy, 133 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Tex. 1955), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Rippy, 233 F.2d
796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Bell v. Rippy, 146 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Tex. 1956),
rev'd sub nom. Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957); Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent
School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957), Jackson v. Rawdon, 135 F.
Supp. 936 (N.D. Tex. 1955), rev'd, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956);
Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956). But see
Robinson v. Board of Educ., 143 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md. 1956) (alternative holding).
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withhold positive action under such circumstances,0 9 the plaintiffs are still entitled to have
their constitutional rights under Brown'00 declared, and to have the lower court "retain
jurisdiction to ascertain and to require actual good faith compliance" with Brown.' ° '
As Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist.10 2 demonstrates, only a finding by
the lower court that desegregation in the schools is complete and that there is "no
reasonable probability of a return" to segregation could justify a dismissal.
Probably the most extreme case requiring a local court to take and retain jurisdic-
tion when a segregated school system was challenged is Holland v. Board of Public
Instruction.0 3 This was not a class action, and the district court, in denying relief, had
specifically found that the single plaintiff involved was in fact going to the school
nearest his home, that his application to a school in another district was rejected be-
cause he did not live in this other school district and not because of race, and that the
applications of white children to this other school had been rejected for this same
reason.' 0 4 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the plaintiff's in-
eligibility to attend that particular school does not excuse a failure to provide non-
segregated schools. Review of the district court's findings was unnecessary because the
record as a whole was said to show that, however it was done, segregation was in fact
being accomplished in the public schools. The court may have been influenced by the
unsuccessful attempts of a sizeable number of other negro residents of the area to
intervene in the appeal. If this decision is followed it may result in an almost automatic
issuance of a general desegregation order and retention of jurisdiction by the district
courts merely upon proof that no public schools in a given locale are attended by both
white and negro pupils. Such questions as exhaustion of admistrative remedies would
become pertinent only in subsequent proceedings to enforce the general order.
Once a district court has a desegregation case properly before it, circumstances may
justify denying immediate injunctive relief while retaining jurisdiction. 105 Kelley v.
Board of Educ.10 6 illustrates a proper use of this procedure. There, upon finding that
the local board was proceeding in good faith to draft a desegregation plan and was
presently awaiting the taking of a school census to this end, the district court granted
a continuance to the next term of court. Matthews v. Lanius'07 rests upon more dubious
grounds. Lack of finances, crowded conditions in the schools, and the "necessity to
readjust" the long-followed system caused the court to delay consideration of a motion
for summary judgment, although the school authorities could merely show "some con-
sideration" of the problem resulting in "little progress." Both overcrowding and, in the
sociological sense, readjustment, have come in for heavy criticism in subsequent cases
when advanced as reasons for delaying integration. 108 The continuance granted here,
even if not clearly warranted, may have been sufficiently offset by the court's direction
at this time that the board make a prompt and reasonable start and report on the pro-
gress of desegregation by the beginning of the next school year, eleven months away.
Whatever procedural distinctions may exist, there is little practical difference between
this type of order and the "all deliberate speed" injunctions next to be discussed.
The least definite type of injunction by which the lower courts have required de-
segregation in the public schools is one which paraphrases the language in the second
99 Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 938 (1957); Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
100 Jackson v. Rawdon, supra note 99.
101 Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957).
102 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
103 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
104 Holland v. Board of Public Instruction, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 785 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
105 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 163 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. La. 1958).
106 139 F. Supp. 578 (M.D. Tenn. 1956).
107 134 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
108 See School Bd. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958); Booker v. State of Tennessee Bd.
of Educ., 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Slemons v. Board of Educ.,
228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
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Brown decision.10 9 Typically, such an order will enjoin the defendants from requiring
and permitting segregation in their schools "from and after such time as may be
necessary to make arrangements for admission of children to such schools on a non-
discriminating basis with all deliberate speed as required . . . [by Brown].""' O In
reversing a district court dismissal of a desegregation case, the Fifth Circuit stated that
a plaintiff challenging a segregated public school system is "at least" entitled to this
form of order."'
While this type of injunction does not tell the school authorities anything regarding
their duties that they should not already be aware of, it does reaffirm the primary
responsibility of the local officials in implementing desegregation.
112 These decrees,
issuing from the local federal court, undoubtedly make the school officials more con-
scious of this responsibility than would knowledge of the abstract legal principle alone.
Such an order leaves the board considerable leeway in fulfilling its responsibility. The
district court in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd." 35 indicated that it did not require
desegregation "overnight, or even in a year or more." 114 Furthermore, a continuance may
serve as a springboard for future court action should the school authorities prove
recalcitrant."15 This form of decree has also withstood subsequent legislative attempts
to evade compliance by shifting responsibility for pupil admissions."16
A more definite approach taken at the outset by some courts is to require local
boards to make a prompt and reasonable start toward desegregation and to submit plans
for total desegregation by a certain date." i 7 While primary responsibility in these
situations still remains with the local school authorities, it is evident that the exercise of
this responsibility is under close surveillance. In contrasting these orders with the
"all deliberate speed" injunctions discussed above, it is interesting to note that the latter
were used in Louisiana,"i 8 South Carolina,"19 and Virginia,' 20 while the former in-
volved three "border states"'12 and Arkansas.' 22 The court in Evans v. Members of the
State Board of Educ.123 required that the local board submit a plan to the state board
in thirty days and that the state board submit it to the court in another thirty days; factors
which might justify delay under the second Brown decision were not considered at this
time since the court held them inapplicable where only a reasonable start was in issue.
The other district courts were more liberal, allowing local boards four,'2 4 eight,' 25 and
109 See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956), afl'd, 242 F.2d
156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); Davis v. County School Bd., 1 RACE REL. L.
REP. 82 (E.D. Va. 1955); Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
110 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., supra note 109 at 342.
Ill Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1957).
112 See Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1957); Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776
E.D.S.C. 1955).
113 138 F. Supp. 337, 341 (E.D. La. 1956).
114 This court may actually have allowed too much leeway since it takes into consideration the
"problem of changing a people's mores" in forming its decree, the sort of factor which has been
rejected elsewhere.
115 See Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957), which directed a district
court to set a time for compliance when the board had taken no steps to comply with an earlier
"all deliberate speed" decree.
116 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 163 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. La. 1958).
117 Kelley v. Board of Educ., 2 RAcE RE.L. L. REP. 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1957); Evans v. Members
of the State Bd. of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 376 (D. Del. 1957); Mitchell v. Pollock, 1 RAcE REL.
L. REP. 1038 (W.D. Ky. 1956); Banks v. Izzard, I RAcE REL. L. REP. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
118 Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956).
119 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
120 Davis v. County School Bd., 1 RACE RE.. L. REP. 82 (E.D. Va. 1955).
121 Kelley v. Board of Educ., 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1957); Evans v. Members
of the State Bd. of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 376 (D. Del. 1957); Mitchell v. Pollock, 1 RAcE REL. L.
REP. 1038 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
122 Banks v. Izzard, 1 RACE RE... L. REP. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
128 149 F. Supp. 376 (D. Del. 1957).
124 Mitchell v. Pollock, 1 RACE RE . L. REP. 1038 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
125 Banks v. Izzard, 1 RAcE RE.. L. REP. 299 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
STUDENT ANALYSIS
fifteen 126 months to arrive at a plan. This may have been caused by the attitude of the
local authorities. However, subsequent litigation indicates that those involved in the
Evans case were uncooperative, 12 7 while in two of the other cases the boards had sub-
mitted plans at the outset'2 s and in one of these desegregation had already begun.' 29
The most direct course of action open to a court with a school desegregation case
before it is to issue an order, enjoining discrimination on a basis of race, effective im-
mediately or at a set date in the very near future. This type of order has been thought
proper at the very outset of the proceedings in many cases; 130 it has also been used to
follow up orders to desegregate "with all deliberate speed,"''1 or to submit desegregation
plans by a given date when local authorities have proved uncooperative, 3 2 or when plans
submitted have been unacceptable. 13 Delay must be justified by the school officials; it
is not automatically excused under the rationale of the second Brown decision. 134 Never-
theless, the local boards are charged with primary responsibility for implementing
school desegregation. Accordingly, the district courts must exercise judgment and
discretion in reviewing their actions and cannot arbitrarily issue desegregation orders. 135
Such orders are clearly proper where the school boards do nothing.' 3 6 They have
also been used, though, in cases where sizeable strides had already been made or were
being made toward desegregation, but the courts found no justification for further
delay.'
3 7
Overcrowding, often coupled with future expansion plans, is a reason frequently
put forth by school boards seeking delays, but it is rejected just as frequently by the
courts.13s This is plainly correct regarding incoming classes; a school may limit or ex-
pand the size of its classes, but there can be no justification for using race as a basis
for deciding who must be sacrificed to maintain reasonably uncrowded classrooms. As
far as intermediate classes are concerned, it may be that children already attending a
particular school under crowded conditions would suffer from a large influx of new
pupils, thus presenting a more legitimate interest to protect. In practice, few negro
children may choose to transfer. More important, there is no indication that children
126 Kelley v. Board of Educ., 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1957). The time was later
extended, 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
127 Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir. 1958).
128 Kelley v. Board of Educ., 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1957); Mitchell v. Pollock,
1 RACE REL. L. RaP. 1038 (W.D. Ky. 1956).
129 Kelley v. Board of Educ., supra note 128.
130 School Bd. v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1958); Atkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Thompson v. County
School Bd., 144 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom. School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911 (1956); Allen v. School Bd., 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 886 (W.D. Va.), aftd,
240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1956); McSwain v. County Bd. of Educ., 138 F.
Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1956) (remand of case arising before Brown); Shedd v. Board of Educ., 1
RACE REL. L. RaP. 521 (S.D. W.Va. 1956); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956); Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955); Jackson
v. Rawdon, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
131 Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957).
132 Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957), afl'd, 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1958).
133 Mitchell v. Pollack, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 305 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
134 Evans v. Members of the State Bd. of Educ., 145 F. Supp. 873 (D. Del. 1956); Allen v.
School Bd., 1 RACE REL. L. RaE. 886 (W.D. Va.), afl'd, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 910 (1956); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956).
135 Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1957).
136 Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957); Allen v. School Bd., I R CE
REr..L. REP. 886 (W.D. Va.), af0'd, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1956);
MeSwain v. County Bd. of Educ., 138 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
137 Shedd v. Board of Educ., 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 521 (S.D. W.Va. 1956) (the board here had
already agreed to desegregate grades one through six at the beginning of the coming school year);
Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956) (only the first
six grades remained segregated).
138 School Bd. v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1958); Shedd v. Board of Educ., 1 RACE RaL. L.
REP. 521 (S.D. W.Va. 1956); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1006 (1956); Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
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already attending a particular school might not validly be given preference in filling
class quotas over those attempting to transfer in, obviating any necessity for main-
taining the illegal standard of race. 139
The local climate of opinion 140 and uncooperative action of other local govern-
mental agencies141 have also been unsuccessfully advanced by school authorities seek-
ing delay; these factors will be discussed below.
Courts issuing orders requiring school officials to set a date for integration have
usually allowed a short period of time, normally less than a year, in setting their
effective date. This is done in order to promote a more orderly transition. Most have
been effective as of the start of a particular semester to avoid mid-semester or mid-year
transfers at the outset of desegregation.
142
Thompson v. County School Bd.14 specifically considered the number of children
involved, the smallness and urban character of the community, the time that might be
needed to comply with any procedures prescribed by an impending special session of the
legislature, and similar factors. Construction presently in progress caused a district
court in West Virginia to allow a delay for one semester in desegregating grades seven
to twelve,' 4 4 but was not a sufficient reason to permit an Ohio school district a one-
year stay in desegregating grades one to six. 145 In a unique 1958 opinion, a district court
in Virginia set September, 1965, as the date by which segregation in the public schools
of Prince Edward County must be terminated; this court based its order on the "some-
what comparable situations" involved in Solon's experiences, the Reconstruction, and
Prohibition. 146 In general, though, these cases reflect the attitude that education "is a
thing that cannot wait and pupils of the proper age are entitled to immediate con-
sideration."'
47
Between the vague but flexible "all deliberate speed" orders and the strict, imme-
diate injunctions against public school segregation lie the orders based on a school
board plan for gradual desegregation over a number of years. Thus far, these orders
have been relatively rare, but because of the notoriety which one of these, the Little
Rock plan, has received, and because of the role community sentiment plays, they will
be considered separately. The primary responsibility of the local school authorities in
implementing desegregation is especially evident here, although in at least one instance
a court put forth its own plan, which was then embodied in a consent decree. 148
Plans formulated by local authorities, however good their intentions may be, have
not always been favorably received by the courts. In Booker v. State of Tennessee Bd.
of Educ., 149 the state board had submitted a plan to desegregate immediately a Memphis
college at the graduate level and work down year-by-year; total desegregation to be
accomplished by the start of the 1959-60 school year. The district court held this to be
a good faith compliance with Brown and one having a greater possibility of eventual
139 See Thompson v. County School Bd., 166 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Va. 1958), aff'd in part sub.
nom. Hamm v. County School Bd., 263 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1959). But cf. Holland v. Board of
Public Instruction, 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
140 Mitchell v. Pollock, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 305 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Jackson v. Rawdon, 235
F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
141 Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1958);
Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957).
142 Evans v. Buchanan, supra note 141; Thompson v. County School Bd., 144 F. Supp. 239
(E.D. Va.), afj'd sub nom. School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
911 (1957); Allen v. School Bd., 1 RACE REL. L. RaP. 886 (W.D. Va.), afl'd, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Shedd v. Board of Educ., 1 RACE R L. L. REP. 521 (S.D.
W.Va. 1956); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956);
Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
143 Supra note 142.
144 Shedd v. Board of Educ., 1 RACE REL. L. RaP. 521 (S.D. W.Va. 1956).
145 Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
146 Allen v. County School Bd., 164 F. Supp. 786, 792 (E.D. Va. 1958).
147 Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177, 180 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
148 Dunn v. Board of Educ., 1 RACE REL. L. RaE'. 319 (S.D. W.Va. 1956).
149 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
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complete acceptance by both races than would an abrupt change. The court of appeals
reversed notwithstanding protestations by the board that the college was underfinanced
and overcrowded to the point of being in danger of losing its accreditation. The school
could, the court replied, simply limit its number of applicants, although not on a basis
of race; as it was, the college was attended by a sizeable number of non-local and out-
of-state students. This was not a class suit; the plantiffs involved wanted to enroll in the
freshman class, and to make them wait five years was found to be a non-compliance with
the Supreme Court's declaration that desegregation was to be accomplished "with all
deliberate speed."
Technically, this case is easily distinguishable from cases such as that approving
the Little Rock plan. 150 Administrative difficulties in desegregating a college would
probably not be as serious as those involved in desegregating a public elementary and
high school system, and, as far as overcrowding is concerned, a college can more easily
limit its enrollment.' 51 It was also not a class action, although the tenor of the opinion
suggests that the same result would have been reached even if it had been. It has been
relied upon in rejecting a plan submitted in a class action which would have accomp-
lished complete desegregation in local grade and high schools in four years.152 At
least those desegregation cases arising in the Sixth Circuit are likely to be strongly
influenced by it.
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit have allowed school boards con-
siderably more leeway in formulating desegregation plans. The Little Rock plan, ap-
proved in Aaron v. Cooper,'53 called for integration of grades ten to twelve in Septem-
ber, 1957, grades seven to nine in 1959 or 1960, and grades one to six by 1963. The
appellate court rejected the challenge that the plan was too slow, relying on the school
board's good faith and the emphasis placed on local factors in the second Brown
decision. Mention was made of problems regarding facilities, teachers, the creation of
teachable groups, curriculum, the maintenance of educational quality, and, significantly,
of the long history of school segregation in the community.15 4 In Moore v. Board of
Educ.'55 a plan was approved providing for the desegregation of eleven elementary
schools (grades one to six) in 1957, three in 1958, and the remaining four in 1959.
Desegregation in the seventh grade was to take place in 1958 and move progressively
upward, providing a completely desegregated school system by 1963.
Without a doubt, serious administrative problems had to be solved in the Aaron
and Moore situations. But the question remains as to what type of administrative problem
cannot be solved in appreciably less time than seven years. Though unexpressed in the
opinions, the answer seems to be community hostility to desegregation. Apparently,
some courts hope for better community adjustment through gradual desegregation.
While this factor was not mentioned in these two cases, unless it was indirectly
referred to in Aaron v. Cooper by the mention of the long-standing community
practice of school segregation, it has been voiced more openly in some desegregation
cases as a factor to be weighed.156 Other courts, however, have firmly rejected com-
15o Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), afl'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957).
151 The courts have been more strict with institutions of higher learning. The graduate school
cases arising before Brown required immediate admission into the schools in question. See, e.g.,
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Board of Control,
83 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1955), requested findings on the factors mentioned in the second Brown decision
in a case involving admission to a law school. These factors were held inapplicable here by the
United States Supreme Court, however, and no reason for delay was found to exist where admission
to a graduate professional school was sought. Florida ex. rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350
U.S. 413 (1956).
152 Mitchell v. Pollock, 2 RAcE REL. L. RaP. 305 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
'53 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), afl'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957).
154 Id. at 860-61.
155 152 F. Supp. 114 (D. Md. 1957), aff'd sub. nonz. Slade v. Board of Educ., 252 F.2d 291
(4th Cir. 1958).
150 Evans v. Members of the State Bd. of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 396 (D. Del. 1957); Robinson v.
Board of Educ., 143 F. Supp. 481, 492 (D. Md. 1956); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F.
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munity opinion 5 7 or racial tension' 58 as factors to be considered in desegregation cases.
Some of the variance between the courts in guiding desegregation may be traceable to
their differing views on the propriety of acknowledging community feelings, at least to
the extent of trying to work the change gradually, as well as to the strength of these
feelings in the communities that are concerned. The directions of the second Brown case
are of little assistance in this regard. Neither the advice that courts may properly regard
the public interest in the "systematic" elimination of obstacles, nor the caveat that
"disagreement" may not force the constitutional principles to yield, squarely meets this
problem. 159 Subsequently, the Court employed language in Cooper v. Aaron that
indicates disapproval of this factor as a consideration. Hostility to racial desegrega-
tion was termed irrelevant in determining whether conditions would justify delaying
immediate general desegregation. 160 Paradoxically, this was written while defending a
seven-year plan from delay. However, the opinion was directed primarily to the
hostility of state officials and the delay sought was contrary to the terms of a definite
court order already in effect. Therefore, the propriety of plans for gradual desegregation
within well-defined limits, which are designed to soothe community sentiment, remains
an open question. 161
After a court has issued a definite order embodying a plan or setting a date for
desegregation, the problem of implementing it remains. It remains for us to consider
briefly the grounds for granting delays or exceptions.'
62
Attempts to delay desegregation are viewed more harshly when the enforcement of
an existing order, rather than the propriety of making an original decree, is in issue.
163
The possibility of allowing a subsequent delay because of adverse conditions created by
the state or local government itself has been firmly denied by the Supreme Court in
Aaron. Even before this decision, time-consuming pupil assignment legislation was
ignored when negro students were denied admission to a white public school in the
wake of a court desegregation order.164 The probability that schools would be closed
pursuant to state legislation if integration took place' 65 or disputes between state and
local school boards' 66 had, likewise, been held to be no reason for delay in formulating
an original order. Community feelings should have no influence in slowing down the
implementation of a desegregation order; a school board was denied a year's delay to
"educate the adults" in preparation for desegregation, the court stating that "racial
tension as a defense has been effectively disposed of by Cooper v. Aaron."
1 67
An interesting situation has developed regarding the rights of individual children
after a plan has been adopted. A district court in Maryland, while approving a plan,
ordered the immediate admission of two children then before the court, although these
children were not yet entitled to admission under the plan.16s The following year the
same court ordered a single plaintiff admitted in another county, although he was not
Supp. 337, 341-42 (E.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
See also Judge Cameron's dissent in Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d
230, 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
157 Jackson v. Rawdon, 235 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956).
158 School Bd. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958).
159 Nor, of course, is this consideration like those administrative problems enumerated in the
second Brown decision, which were said to justify delay.
160 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
161 But see School Ed. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958). This court said that Cooper v.
Aaron had effectively disposed of racial tension as a reason for delay.
162 Use of the contempt power and civil rights legislation is discussed below.
163 Thompson v. County School Ed., 159 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 929
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
164 Thompson v. County School Rd., supra note 163.
165 Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957).
166 Evans v. Buchanan, 152 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1957), afl'd, 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1958).
167 School Bd. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958).
168 Moore v. Board of Educ., 152 F. Supp. 114 (D. Md. 1957), aff'd sub. nom. Slade v. Board
of Educ., 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958).
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eligible under the plan there in effect, which was apparently proceeding well.' 69 The
administrative problems which might justify a delay in general desegregation were held
inapplicable when only one child was concerned, and the court stressed the personal
nature of the constitutional right involved. If sizeable numbers of children choose to
exercise their personal rights in any one area, the concept of "planned" desegregation may




In a number of cases, attempts to bring about school desegregation have met with
forceful resistance. We will now consider the resources available for meeting such re-
sistance. Although the contempt power has been employed only twice in connection with
the desegregation of public schools, 170 it nevertheless looms large as a potent and cap-
able judicial sanction.
The traditional contempt power of the federal courts is presently embodied in and
to some extent limited by statute.171 Under this statute, acts of contempt - other than
those committed in the physical presence of the court, which can be punished sum-
marily - are classified as either civil or criminal. The proceeding in cases of civil
contempt is remedial and coercive in its nature, instituted to preserve and enforce the
rights of a successful litigant by compelling obedience to the orders and decrees issued
in the litigation.172 Civil contempt is usually punished either by a compensatory fine
payable to the complainant 173 or by imprisonment until the order involved is complied
with.174 Civil contempt proceedings must be commenced by the aggrieved party or
someone who has an interest in the right entitled to protection. 175 The burden of
proving the defendant's contemptuous act for purposes of civil contempt is satisfied
by clear and convincing evidence176 and it is immaterial that his contemptuous acts
169 Groves v. Board of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 621 (D. Md.), aft'd, 261 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1958).
170 In re John Kasper, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Kasper v.
Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957) (contempt of temporary re-
straining order); United States v. Kasper, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 795 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) (contempt
of subsequently issued permanent injunction).
171 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952):
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment,
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as -
1) Misbehaviour of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, rule, decree, or
command.
See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), where the court interpreted the language in a con-
tempt statute similar to § 401 as denying the lower federal courts the traditional power summarily to
punish as contempt, acts which do not occur in physical proximity to the court. See also Frank-
furter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal
Courts - A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010 (1924). Other limitations upon
the contempt power are found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691-92 (1952), which grant a jury trial in
certain specified criminal contempt cases. The contempt power is held to be inherent in all courts, al-
though in the federal courts it is subject to congressional regulation. Michaelson v. United States
ex rel. Chicago, St.P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924). Contra, Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 196 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
172 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911).
173 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
supra note 172, at 441.
174 Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); Sauber v. Whetstone, 199 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1952); In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448 (8th Cir. 1902) (county court judges conditionally committed to
coerce compliance to a federal district court writ of mandamus).
375 FTC v. McLean & Son, 94 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1938).
176 Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929); Fox v. Capital Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1938);
Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 77 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1935).
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were made in good faith or were not in wilful disregard of the decree or order. 177 The
fact of disobedience alone is sufficient to establish guilt.
Criminal contempt differs from civil contempt in that criminal contempt proceed-
ings are not remedial, but have as their primary purpose the preservation of the court's
power and the vindication of its dignity and authority.' 78 An act, to be characterized as
criminal contempt, must therefore be disrespectful of the court, designed to bring the
court into disrepute, or of such a nature that it tends to obstruct the administration of
justice.' 7 9 Inasmuch as the public is considered to be the injured party, sanctions for
criminal contempt generally consist of punitive fines payable to the government' 80 or
unconditional imprisonment for a fixed term,181 though on occasion conditional penalties
have been inflicted.
8 2
Where the contemptuous act also constitutes a crime under federal or state law, and
the accused is a natural person, the punishment imposed cannot exceed six months' con-
finement or a fine of $1,000 or both, 183 except where the contempt is of an order entered
in a suit brought in the name of or on behalf of the United States.' 8 4 Criminal contempt
proceedings may be initiated upon the court's own motion, by the United States attorney,
or by a court-appointed attorney. 185 In actual practice, the court often appoints the plain-
tiff's attorney to prosecute the contempt action.' 8 6 This policy is particularly important
since in many cases the plaintiff or his attorney will be the court's only source of in-
formation.' 8 7 In an action for criminal contempt, proof of wilful misbehavior on the
part of the defendant is essential,' 88 and guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 189
177 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); Morse-Starrett Prod. Co. v.
Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725, 727 (5th
Cir. 1941). See also Note, 48 MICH. L. Rav. 860 (1950).
178 See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911); Moscovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 780 (1943).
79 Lopiparo v. United States, 222 F.2d 897, 898 (8th Cir. 1955); Conley v. United States, 59
F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1932); Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 131 F.
Supp. 866, 871 (D. Hawaii 1955).
180 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05 (1947) (fine imposed partly as compensation
to the complainant and partly as punishment); Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 740 (1945). See McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211, 214
(2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied sub nom. McCann v. Leibell, 299 U.S. 603 (1936).
181 Duell v. Duell, 178 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Rapp v. United States, 146 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1944).
182 See Application of Patterson, 125 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 219 F.2d 659
(2d Cir. 1955) (ninety-day imprisonment conditioned on compliance with order to produce records
for federal tax audit).
183 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
184 Ibid.
185 FED. R. CRIm. P. 42(b). See Western Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfried, 136 F.2d 98, 100-01
(9th Cir. 1943); McCauley v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 276 Fed. 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1921).
186 See, e.g., McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1935), cert.
denied sub nom. McCann v. Leibell, 299 U.S. 603 (1936).
187 McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, supra note 186 at 214. The first contempt conviction
of John Kasper resulted from a petition for a contempt citation by the school authorities. McSwain
v. Board of Educ., 1 RACE REL. L. RaE'. 812 (E.D. Tenn. 1956), af0'd sub nom. Kasper v. Brittain,
245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
188 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (dictum); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co. 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1936); Welling v.
United States, 9 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1925). See the district court's instructions to the jury in United
States v. Kasper, 2 RACE Rm. L. REP. 795, 797 (E.D. Tenn. 1957).
189 United States v. UMW, supra note 188, at 303 (1947); United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947). For discussions of the various tests to deter-
mine wilfullness, see Moscovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. Rav.
780, 793-96 (1943); Note, 32 IND. L.J. 514, 520-24 (1957).
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Although defendants in contempt proceedings do not have a constitutional right
to trial by jury, 190 Congress has provided for a jury in criminal contempt cases
where the contempt is an act which also constitutes a state or federal criminal offense.191
This provision does not apply to direct contempts, that is, those "committed in the
presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere directly with the administration
of justice,"'192 nor to contempts in disobedience of a lawful court order entered in a
suit "prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States."'1 93 In relation to
school desegregation, the right to demand a jury trial is of special significance when the
accused has allegedly interfered with the efforts of school authorities to comply with
a desegregation order. Where such conduct includes inciting others to disregard the
court's injunctive order, as well as preventing Negroes from entering the newly integrated
school, the acts may also constitute violations of numerous federal and state statutes
including breach of the peace and simple assault. It was for this reason that John
Kasper and others were tried by a jury for criminal contempt of the permanent in-
junction entered against them in connection with desegregation of the Clinton High
School.' 9 4 The unsuccessful efforts of southern congressmen to include in Part V of
the 1957 Civil Rights Act,195 a provision for jury trials in all criminal contempts
probably indicates a feeling that the contempt power in civil rights cases will be less
stringently applied in the hands of a southern jury. However, John Kasper's conviction
of criminal contempt at the hands of an all-white jury indicates that a southern jury
trial is not necessarily a means of escaping criminal liability for violent and willful re-
sistance to valid court orders.
Although the charge of criminal contempt does not afford a person the con-
stitutional guarantees of grand jury indictment and jury trial in the presentation of his
defense,190 he is entitled to all other constitutional safeguards granted to criminal
defendants. 197 With the sole exception of cases based on the certification of the judge
who saw and heard the contemptuous conduct committed in the actual presence of
the court, the federal rules forbid summary punishment for a criminal contempt. 198
Consequently, punishment for all indirect or constructive contempts, that is, those
committed beyond the presence of the court, as well as those direct contempts com-
190 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159-60
(1948); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-95 (1895). See generally Note, Jury Trial for Criminal Con-
tempts, 65 YALE U-T. 846 (1956).
191 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1952).
192 Ibid. The phrase "so near thereto" has been construed to mean misbehavior in the geographi-
cal vicinity of the court, that is, there must be a physical proximity to the court, not merely a direct
relation to the work of the court. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). This would include
"every part of the place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors, and witnesses."
Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889). Misbehavior of any person obstructing the administration
of justice which does not constitute contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 must be prosecuted as a crime
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952), with the attendant constitutional safeguards afforded in the usual
criminal prosecutions.
198 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1952).
1 4 See United States v. Kasper, 2 RAcE REL. L. RaP. 795 (E.D. Tenn. 1957). It appears, however,
that in the earlier conviction of Kasper for criminal contempt of the restraining order issued against
him, neither Kasper nor his attorney requested a jury trial and none was granted. In re Kasper, 1
RAcE REL. L. REP. 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1956), afl'd sub nom. Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957). See McLeod, Why the Clinton Defendants Were Entitled to
a Jury Trial, 18 ALA LAW. 412 (1957).
195 See Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1957 and Contempt of Court, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 661,
674-76 (1958). A compromise measure was ultimately adopted which afforded the right to a jury
trial in a limited number of criminal contempts.
196 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1958).
'97 See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925). See also Note, 36 U. DaT. LJ. 180,
188 (1958), which enumerates the following:
.. (1) the presumption of innocence, (2) the necessity for proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, (3) the privilege against self-incrimination, (4) the right to
counsel, (5) the right to be advised of charges against him, (6) the right to make
a defense, and (7) the right to compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses.
198 FED. R. CRIM. P.'42.
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mitted "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,"' 99 may be ordered
only after notice and allowance of a reasonable time for the preparation of the de-
fense.
200
Owing to material procedural and substantive differences in actions for criminal
and civil contempt, negro complainants seeking enforcement of a desegregation decree
against defendant school authorities committing specific acts of discrimination will not
only find it more expedient to initiate civil contempt proceedings, but will in all probabil-
ity discover that federal judges are more sympathetic to imposing remedial measures
than punitive fines or imprisonment. Also, in many instances the alleged wrongful
conduct of the school authorities is due to compliance with the mandates of the state
legislature, such as school-closing plans or leasing arrangements, 20 ' making it extremely
difficult to establish wilful misconduct. Actually, if the interference originates pursuant
to a state statute, the courts would probably prefer to declare the statutes unconstitu-
tional in a proceeding brought for that purpose. But this alternative is not always avail-
able, and as a consequence, the school authorities are placed in the awkward position
exemplified by the case of Aaron v. Cooper.20 2 In this case the governor closed the
public schools and intimated that the only method of educating the school children was
to close the schools and lease the school property (which would have become "surplus
property") to a private agency which in turn would operate the schools on a racially
segregated basis. The court stated: "Obstructions to their taking of some step or steps
in accordance with the [order] might ... enable them to make defense to a charge of
contempt.... Above all, would it be legally improper for them to take any affirmative
step of action or collaboration, which either was intended or manifestly would serve to
hamper or thwart the execution of such order."'203 Thus, as this case demonstrates, local
school officials are bound as representatives of the state to protect the constitutional
rights of negro pupils. Failure to act in good faith in carrying out a desegregation order
would render them liable to the contempt power of the court.
Although Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in-
junctions "shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by
reference to the complaint or other document, the acts sought to be restrained. .. ."
The court may, under exceptional circumstances, particularly where the public interest
is involved, grant a broad injunction. 20 4-20 6 The Supreme Court has, on at least one
occasion, made it clear that defendants are not free to disregard a court decree simply
because a particular evasive device was not specifically enjoined.2 0 7 Applying these
principles to desegregation orders, it is evident that many of the various devices
advanced to thwart integration, such as school-closing plans, school-placement laws,
school-redistricting statutes, and the lease or sale of school property for the purpose of
implementing racial segregation, 208 could theoretically subject the school and various
public officials involved to contempt sanctions. To date, however, the courts have under-
standably pursued other courses of action.
Once it was customary to issue injunctions purportedly binding the whole world.
2 09
199 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1952).
200 FED. R. CRiM. P. 42; see generally, 4 BARRON, FEDERAL P caIcE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2421-28
(1951).
201 E.g., Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958).
202 Ibid.
203 Id. at 103-04.
204-206 See Bowles v. Leithold, 155 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1945). The injunction enjoined the sale or
delivery of any commodities in violation of price ceilings and further enjoined alleged violations of
record keeping requirements, although there was no allegation of the former type of violation.
207 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1949). See also Maggio v. Zeitz,
333 U.S. 55 (1948).
208 See Part III infra.
209 E.g., Chisom v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C.C.D.S.C. 1903). The same injunction, issued against
not only named persons but against "all persons whomsoever," was held to be too broad in the light
of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188
(E.D.S.C. 1954).
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This is no longer done under modern injunctive practices. 2 10 Rule 65(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, generally thought to embody the general common law doc-
trine that only parties, their privities, or those subject to their control are bound by an
injunction,211 specifies:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order ... is binding only
upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys,
and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive
actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
It should be noted, however, that an employee who subsequently terminates his
employment is no longer bound by the injunction, provided his termination was not
merely a subterfuge,2 1 2 and he does not in fact collude with the enjoined party.213
An injunction against a corporation, of course, binds its officers, agents, successors and
assigns to the extent that such persons abet the corporation-defendant in violating the
injunction.
2 14
Hence, in the context of public school desegregation, the initial decree ordering
desegregation in a particular school district binds not only the named school authorities,
but also teachers and administrative officials. Civil contempt proceedings thus would
properly lie where named school officials continue to discriminate against negro plain-
tiffs, and teachers and administrative officials who continue to work in these illegally
segregated schools might also be subject to civil contempt sanctions, both as employees
of the school board, and by being in active concert with them in violating the decree.
For although, under unusual circumstances, obstructions in the path of compliance with
an order of the court may enable a person successfully to defend against a charge of
civil2 15 or criminal216 contempt, subordinates cannot immunize themselves from civil
contempt by asserting merely that their contemptuous conduct resulted from their obliga-
tion to obey their superiors. 217 Further, an enjoined school official might be held guilty of
civil contempt if he knowingly permits subordinates to disobey or disregard the injunc-
tion,218 since the enjoined officials have the affirmative duty to carry out, to the full
extent of their official powers, the supreme law of the land in desegregating the schools
under their supervision. 219
Since the contempt power can be employed against all persons bound by an injunc-
tion,2 20 the immunity afforded public officials acting as agents of the state under the
eleventh amendment 221 probably would not bar the imposition of contempt sanctions
210 Chase Nat'l. Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436-37 (1934); Kean v. Hurley, 179
F.2d 888, 890 (8th Cir. 1950), affirming sub nom. Kean v. Bailey, 82 F. Supp. 260 (D.Minn. 1949);
Alemite Mfg. Co. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
211 Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945): "In essence it is that defendants may
not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors, although they were
not parties to the original proceeding."
212 , Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1950).
213 Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930). The obvious basis for this principle
is that since the alleged contemner was not a party to the original action, and is asserting an in-
dividual right, he has not yet had his day in court. To punish him for violation of the injunction would
be to condemn him without a hearing; accord, Hoover Co. v. Exchange Vacuum Cleaner Co., 1 F.
Supp. 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
214 United States v. Porkownik, 182 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950).
215 See Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1958); cf. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56
(1948); Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1942).
216 Healey v. United States, 186 F.2d 164, 171 (9th Cir. 1950). It is unlikely that the requirement
of wilful disobedience demanded in criminal contempt could be met wheie the subordinate merely
carries out orders given to him by his superior.
217 See Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366, 379 (D.C.Cir. 1951), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 806
(1952).
218 See NLRB v. Rath Packing Co., 130 F.2d 540 (8th Cir. 1942); cf. United Mine Workers v.
United States, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
219 Aarqn v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1958).
220 See Murphy, The Contempt Power of the Federal Courts, 18 FED. BAR 3. 41-42, n. 28 (1958).
221 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State ..
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
upon a school board, teachers or administrative officials. Numerous federal decisions
have held that where the action of a state official violates the Constitution, immunity
does not obtain since, when he so acts, he is not acting in the name of the state.
2 2 2 -2 28
Undoubtedly the most difficult questions in the use of the contempt power center
around situations where the persons involved were neither parties to the original action
nor in privity with them.224 Under Rule 65(d), previously discussed, third parties are
bound by an injunction only if they are in active concert with the enjoined party or his
privies, and receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.225 The
problem, of course, is to define when acts are "done in concert" with the enjoined parties.
Perhaps the most important case defining federal contempt power in this area is
Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Stoff. 2 2 6 There the court refused to cite for criminal contempt an
employee who after terminating his employment proceeded to infringe patents covered in
an injunction previously issued against his former employer. For the court, Judge
Learned Hand states:
[T]he only occasion when a person not a party may be punished [for contempt],
is when he has helped to bring about, not merely what the decree has forbidden . . .
but what it has power to forbid, an act of a party. This means that . . . [he] must
either abet the defendant or must be legally indentified with him.227-229
If narrowly construed, this language, which is the precursor of Rule 65(d), would
unquestionably curtail the court's contempt power. An analysis of the cases in the area,
particularly those dealing with the concept of abetting, however, indicates that there
are limited situations where a third person, not legally identified with the enjoined
party, or actually abetting him, may be held in contempt.
In a case decided prior to the Hand decision, In re Reese,2 s0 a non-party to the
original order enjoining interference with certain mines was convicted of criminal con-
tempt for violating the injunction independently of the enjoined parties. Upon appeal
from a reversal of the conviction, 23 ' it was held that although he could not technical-
222-223 See ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally, Note, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 757
(1957). But see Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ala. 1955), where the court refused
to impose a compensatory fine against the school board in an action for civil contempt arising out
of the board's disobedience of an order enjoining it from wage discrimination against negro school
teachers. The court concluded that the board could not be held to respond in monetary damages
either in an action ex contractu or ex delicto, and thus the court was without power to impose a
compensatory fine in favor of the negro petitioners in a civil contempt proceeding. The court made it
clear that to do so would be to authorize a suit, proscribed by the eleventh amendment, against the
State of Alabama, for the conduct of the individual board members who acted in violation of the
fourteenth amendment, and in a manner unauthorized under the laws of the state and the powers
conferred upon the board. Ingenious as the court's reasoning might seem, several areas of dispute
are apparent in the decision. First, it is highly questionable that a county school board should be
considered a state agency within the eleventh amendment's ambit when it acts in violation of the
Constitution. Secondly, the decision creates the anomalous situation of a court finding jurisdiction
to enjoin illegal action, but having no jurisdiction to enforce the injunction. Finally, the court seemed
to feel that the plaintiffs could be equally compensated by bringing contempt proceedings against the
school board members individually, thus avoiding an eleventh-fourteenth amendment conflict.
224 See generally, Murphy, The Contempt Power of the Federal Courts, 18 FED. B. J. 34 (1958);
Comment, What Remedies are Available to Enforce the Supreme Court's Mandate to Desegregate and
Who May Use Them, 9 HAsTINGs L. J. 167, 173-76 (1958); Note, Implementation of Desegregation
by the Lower Courts, 71 HAav. L. Rav. 486, 495-98 (1958); Note, Contempt by Strangers, 43 VA. L.
R . 1294 (1957); Note, Criminal Contempt: Violations of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 32
IND. L. J. 514 (1957); Note, The Federal Courts and Indirect Criminal Contempt, 10 VAND. L. Rnv.
831 (1957).
225 Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1951); Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir.
1950), affirming sub. nom. Kean v. Bailey, 82 F. Supp. 260 (D.Minn. 1949); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v.
Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930); Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C. 1954); United
States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
226 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
227-229 Id. at 833.
230 98 Fed. 984 (C.C.D. Kan. 1900).
231 In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942, 945 (8th Cir. 1901). Although the reversal of the conviction was
upheld because of an error in pleading, the court's language is significant:
The word 'disobedience' aptly applies to a party or other person against
whom an order is made. The word 'resistance' manifestly is applicable to a party
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ly be convicted for violating the injunction, since he was not a party, and did not aid or
abet a party, his conviction could be sustained because his actions, done with full knowl-
edge of the injunction, seriously obstructed the administration of justice, and, in effect,
nullified the court order.
The reasoning was subsequently interpreted by the court in Chisolm v. Caines
23 2
as supporting a criminal contempt conviction of a non-party for trespassing in
violation of a known injunction. Although Judge Hand in Alemite disapproved of the
Reese dictum insofar as it supported the decision in Chisolm, it appears clear that the
Reese court only meant to apply its language to situations where a third party actually
impeded the court in administering justice between the litigants in a private law suit. In
this sense the third party would be "abetting the defendant," for the court would be
frustrated in its attempt to correct or prohibit what it had judicially decided was illegal.
The criminal contempt arises from the willful attempt-by any person to prevent or frus-
trate the execution of a valid process of a court.
What appears to be the correct understanding of Reese is illustrated by Gonigon v.
United States.2 33 There the court reversed a criminal contempt conviction, since no
evidence demonstrated that the defendant actually knew of the existence of the injunc-
tion. In its opinion the court states:
[The defendant] was bound, alike with other members of the public, to observe ...
[the] restrictions [of the injunction] when known, to the extent that he must not aid
or abet its violation by others, nor set the known command of the court at defiance,
by interference with or obstruction of the administration of justice; and the power of
the court to proceed against one so offending and punish for the contemptuous con-
duct is inherent and indisputable. [Citations omitted]. We believe the above mentioned
distinction in contempt proceedings, between disobedience of the injunction by parties
and privies and the conduct of others in contempt of the authority and commands
of the court, to be elementary ... 234 (Emphasis added.)
Although both Reese and Gonigon arose in the context of labor violence, which
gives possible doubt to their general value as precedent, they should prove to be of con-
trolling value in the face of violent resistence to a lawful desegregation order by recal-
citrant third parties. Hence, even though a third person is not a party to an injunction
proceeding, or in privity with a party, or actually abetting a party, he may be subject to
citation for contempt in the limited situation where he has knowledge of the injunction
and his actions impede the administration of justice to such an extent that, in effect,
they are "done in concert" with a party and anull the intent or purpose of the original
decree.
to the suit and may be applicable to other persons .... [A]ny person, whether
a party to a suit or not, having knowledge that a court of competent jurisdiction
has ordered certain persons to do or to abstain from doing certain acts, cannot
intentionally interfere to thwart the purposes of the court in making such order.
Such an act.., is a flagrant disrespect to the court which issues it, and an un-
warranted interference with and obstruction to the orderly and effective admin-
istration of justice, and as such is and ought to be treated as a contempt of the
court which issued the order. Such contempts, however, are totally different
offenses from those which the parties to the case commit when they disobey a
direct order made in a case for the benefit of the complainant. The one is an
offense against the majesty and dignity of the law. The other is a violation of
the rights of a particular suitor, at whose instance and for whose protection the
particular injunctive order disobeyed was issued by the court.
232 121 Fed. 397 (E.D.S.C. 1903). There was no obstruction of justice here as in Reese since
the alleged contemners' conduct in no way interfered with the court's task of doing justice between
the parties. Their action did not bring about the enjoined activity, i.e., trespass on complainant's
property by the enjoined party. The same injunction was held not to support a charge of criminat
contempt for trespass by non-parties in Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C. 1954).
233 163 Fed. 16 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514 (1909).
234 Id. at 20. See also United States v. Murray, 61 F. Supp. 415, 419 (E.D. Mo. 1945): "If the
orders of the Court are to be set aside, and their execution prevented by private citizens . . . then
the Court would be powerless to enforce its decrees. That the execution of Court orders shall not be
interfered with is the very bedrock of the power of Courts to administer justice."
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(b) Supplementary Injunction.
Owing to the delicate situation existing in much of the South, neither civil nor
criminal contempt has been extensively used in the school desegregation cases. Both the
courts and litigants seem to prefer other methods of restraining specific state and private
attempts to avoid integration, particularly the supplementary injunction.
In a number of cases the federal courts have given supplementary injunctive relief
against violence, acting in aid either of a previous judicial order,2 35 or of a desegregation
plan adopted by local authorities without judicial intervention.23 6-240 .
Several recent cases are illustrative of the use of the supplementary injunction in
integration cases. The court in Thompson v. County School Bd.,2 41 when faced with the
issue of citing school authorities for violating a prior injunctive order, found that the de-
fendants had acted in good faith relying on a pupil placement act passed after the entry
of the injunctive order, and that they "did not intend any defiance of the injunction.
'242
Rather than hold the school authorities in civil contempt and impose conditional punish-
ment, the court took the milder course of issuing a supplemental decree specifically
defining their duties under the prior order, thus giving them the opportunity of avoiding
a contempt citation.
The supplementary injunction was also used in connection with the Arkansas school-
closing and property-leasing law in Aaron v. Cooper.243 In issuing an order enjoining
school authorities in Little Rock from leasing school property to a private school cor-
poration for the avowed purpose of maintaining racially segregated schools, the court
made it clear that the leasing arrangement constituted a violation of the existing decree
binding the school officials.2 44 The court emphasized that "any attempts, from whatever
source occurring, to interfere with or prevent the carrying out of the integration plan,
would not release [the school authorities] from the obligation of the judicial order against
them."
245
In Hoxie, Tennessee, a device not unlike the supplementary injunction was used to
restrain interference with a desegregation plan adopted by local school authorities with-
out judicial compulsion. The school board had voluntarily begun desegregating its
schools on the assumption that the School Segregation Cases had rendered invalid
all state laws imposing racially segregated public education in Tennessee. Through acts
of boycott, trespass, picketing, and threats of bodily harm individuals had succeeded in
suspending the operation of the schools. In response to a petition by the board, a pre-
liminary injunction was issued enjoining further interference by these persons;24 6 the
order was subsequently made permanent.2 47 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the
permanent injunction against attacks upon the jurisdiction of the district court. 248 Since
there had been no prior decree enjoining segregation, the court was unable to utilize its
ancillary equity power. However, it found that the school authorities were not only under
a constitutional duty to accord equal protection of the law in the operation of the Hoxie
schools, but they also possessed a corresponding federal right to be free from direct
interference in the performance of their duty.
2 4 9
235 McSwain v. Board of Educ., 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 872 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
236-240 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
241 159 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 252 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 958 (1958).
242 159 F. Supp. at 571.
243 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958). The injunction was subsequently entered by the district court
pursuant to mandate of the Eighth Circuit and is reported in Aaron v. Cooper, 169 F. Supp. 369
(E.D. Ark. 1959).
244 261 F.2d at 105.
245 Id. at 103.
246 Hoxie School Dist. v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1955).
247 Hoxie School Dist. v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
248 Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
249 Id. at 98-101. In addition to establishing jurisdiction upon the federal right-duty basis,
the court also found jurisdiction under REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1952),
dealing with conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. See pp. 760-61 infra.
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These cases aptly demonstrate the convenience and effectiveness of the supple-
mentary injunction in desegregation cases.
(c) Obstruction of Justice
When the conduct of the defendant does not amount to contempt, it may give
rise to criminal prosecution for the "obstruction of justice." 250 This was the view of the
Supreme Court reversing the criminal contempt conviction of the defendant in Nye v.
United States.2 5 1 In that case the Court refused to uphold as contemptuous the unlawful
means used by Nye to procure the dismissal of a suit in the federal court, since such
behavior occurred over 100 miles from the courtroom and thus not "in the presence of
the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." However, the
Court indicated that such conduct need not go unpunished, but that any punishment
'must be under the Criminal Code where they [the defendants] will be afforded the
normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecution. '252 Nye was subsequently indicted
for willful and corrupt obstruction of justice and his conviction was upheld on appeal.2 5
3
The range of activity which could result in prosecution under the code provisions
varies widely, including in its coverage obstruction of or assault on process servers;254
resistance to extradition agents of the United States;2 55 attempts to influence jurors by
written communication;2 56 theft or alteration of records or processes; 257 picketing or
parading near a building housing a court of the United States or occupied by a judge,
juror, witness, or court officer,2 58 and recording, listening to, or observing proceedings of
a grand jury that is in the process of deliberating or voting.2 59 However, in the context
of public school desegregation, the so-called "omnibus provision" of section 1503260 is
most pertinent. The language of this provision is broad enough to encompass the activity
of third persons who, by threats or force, seek to discourage negro plaintiffs from fur-
ther prosecuting desegregation suits already instituted against school authorities. Even
if the attempt to prevent the prosecution of the suit proves unsuccessful, the defendant
could still be charged with obstruction under the statute.
2 61
The statute requires the act charged as obstruction to be done in relation to a pro-
ceeding then pending in a federal court.2 62 A case is considered pending upon the filing
of a complaint with a commissioner, charging a violation of the laws of the United
States.26 3 Additionally, this statute can be applied to civil actions in federal courts to
which the United States is not a party, since the justice being administered is that of the
United States.2 64 When the case has been finally dismissed, the statute becomes inap-
250 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-07 (1952); 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (Supp. 1958).
251 313 U.S. 33 (1941).-
252 Id. at 52-53.
253 Nye v. United States, 137 F.2d 73 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 755 (1943).
254 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1952).
255 Id. at § 1502.
256 Id. at § 1504.
257 Id. at § 1506.
258 Id. at § 1507.
259 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (Supp. 1958).
260 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952).
[W]hoever... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
261 See United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). "It [the statute] condemns
not only the corrupt obstruction of the administration of justice but also any endeavor to corrupt the
due administration of justice." See also United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921), holding that
the successful corruption simply aggravates the severity of the offense.
262 United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Pettibone v. United States,
148 U.S. 197 (1893) (dictum). But see United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, cert. denied, 316 U.S.
678 (1942).
263 United States v. Bittinger, 24 Fed. Cas. 1149 (No. 14,598) (D.C.W.D. Mo. 1876).
264 Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911, 912 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 590 (1924).
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plicable,2 65 but it is generally recognized that when the court has issued an injunction,
the proceedings are not at an end until full performance under the decree has been ob-
tained.2 66 A conviction under this act has been upheld where the defendants destroyed
two railroad bridges in violation of an injunction prohibiting the hindrance of the opera-
tion of a railroad and destruction of railroad property.267 Apparently since violation of
this injunction was sufficient to permit a court to find an obstruction of justice, a viola-
tion of an injunction in a segregation dispute could be considered equally violative if
the execution of a court order is impeded. Also, the defendant, for the same act, could
be found guilty both of criminal contempt and of violating this statute without being
put in double jeopardy, since the two constitute independent offenses against two separ-
ate authorities.268 "Obstruction of justice" thus provides the court with an additional
judicial sanction to insure the fair administration of justice in the area of segregation.
(d) Military Force
Because the federal judiciary possesses little in the way of sanctions, other than its
contempt powers, to insure the enforcement and implementation of its decrees, it must
often turn to the state and federal executive authorities and the military power at their
disposal for assistance.
Where the order of a federal court is met with flagrant interference and its authority
flouted through mob action, the court normally looks to the federal marshall. This pro-
cedure failing, the court will then generally turn to the governor of the state wherein the
violence is occurring. It is clear that, if the law of the state permits the use of military
force,2 69 a governor is empowered to suppress disorder whenever, in his discretion, he
determines that the exigencies of the situation require such action.270 This discretion,
though extremely broad, is still subject to judicial review by the federal courts.2 71 Where
the disorder occurs in opposition to a decree of a federal court, the governor's use of
the power is proper only if employed "to aid in making its process effective and not to
nullify it; to remove and not to create, obstructions to the exercise by the complainants
of their rights as judicially declared.
2 72
When the use of the state military authority proves inadequate to support and en-
force a valid federal court decree, or if state authorities fail to use their power to sup-
press any violent opposition to a court order which sustains an individual's federal con-
stitutional rights, the President may employ federal troops to protect these rights. This
authority is derived directly from three sections of the United States Code,2 78 which
authorize the use of federal troops even in circumstances where the governor of the
state has failed or refused to request such aid.
2 7 4
265 United States v. Thomas, 47 Fed. 807 (W.D. Va. 1891) (beating of witness two months after
dismissal of case not offense under statute).
266 See Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957); Taylor
v. United States, 2 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 634 (1925).
267 Taylor v. United States, supra note 266.
268 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
269 Whether, and under what circumstances, this military force can be used by the governor
is a matter for determination by state courts under local law. See Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule
and The National Emergency, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1942). See also, Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378, 396 (1932).
270 Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 867-68 (1934).
271 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
272 Id. at 404; see also, Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff'd sub nom.
Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958). Compare the
use of the power by Governor Clement of Tennessee in connection with the desegregation of Clinton
High School, reported in Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834
(1957), with the illegal use of military force by Governor Faubus in connection with the court-
ordered desegregation of Little Rock Central High School, reported in Aaron v. Cooper, supra.
273 70A Stat. 15 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (Supp. 1958).
274 The authority of the President to enforce federal laws by the use of federal troops and
state militia has greatly occupied the attention of law review writers since the advent of the desegrega-
tion of public schools. For general discussion of this Presidential military power, see Faust, The
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4. Free Speech
A perennial problem in the development of constitutionally-protected civil rights,
and one which underlies the whole problem of the enforcement, has been the necessity
for the reconciliation of conflicting liberties. Freedom to express one's opinions on all
public issues, no matter how controversial, is one of the most precious rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. 275 The segregation decisions have evoked a nationwide, emotionally-
charged controversy regarding the proper position of racial minority groups in our
society. This raises several questions concerning the extent to which individuals may
express their opposition to desegregation without violating the newly found rights of
these groups. As yet, there is little authority directly in point. Nevertheless, cases fixing
the boundaries of free speech and press in analogous situations embody principles which
in most instances would be dispositive of these questions.
It is settled that statements made in a court's presence which impugn its dignity or
interfere with its processes may be summarily punished as contemptuous without vio-
lating the right to freedom of speech.
2 76
The degree of criticism and the extent of public comment made out of court con-
cerning a pending case which a judge must endure is no longer a serious issue if, at the
time of the statement, only a non-jury question remains to be decided. At common law
any comment made while a case is still pending may subject the commentator to con-
tempt proceedings if it has a reasonable tendency to deprive a court of the power to
administer justice impartially.2 77 The reasonable tendency test of the common law was
repudiated in Bridges v. California,278 where the clear and present danger rule2 72 was
substituted as the proper criterion for determining whether an out-of-court publication
concerning a pending non-jury case constitutes contempt. Neither the threat of a para-
lyzing dock workers' strike if the judge's decision was not reversed, nor forebodings of
evil if certain alleged criminals were not given prison sentences was found to meet the
test. This principle was extended in Pennekamp v. Florida,280 where false charges con-
cerning a judge's conduct in a pending case were held not to' constitute a clear and
present danger to the fair administration of justice. Although it has been grudgingly
conceded that a publication may conceivably be punishable as contemptuous, 2 81 it seems
that as a practical matter judges are defenseless against criticism or prejudicial com-
ment.28 2 Thus, in communities where the exponents of segregation are vociferous, and
President's Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Law, 7 CLQE.-MA. 'L. REv. 362 (1958); Pollitt,
Presidential Use of Troops to Execute the Laws: A Brief History, 36 N.C.L. Ray. 117 (1958); Note,
2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1051, 1071-80 (1957). For discussion specifically relating to President Eisen-
hower's action in ordering federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, and federalizing the Arkansas
militia to prevent obstruction of the court's decree ordering the desegregation of Little Rock Central
High School, see 41 Ops. Atty. Gen. 67 (1957); 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2394 (Feb. 10, 1959) (in support);
Pittman, The Federal Invasion of Arkansas in the Light of the Constitution, 20 GA. BAR. J. 325
(1958) (in opposition); Schweppe, Enforcement of Federal Court Decrees: A "Recurrence to
Fundamental Principles", 44 A.B.AJ. 113 (1958) (in opposition); Comment, 56 MIcH. L. Rnv. 249
(1957) (in support).
275 "Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom." Cardozo, J. in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
276 Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949). This case was decided under the fourteenth rather
than the first amendment because state action was involved. Cf., Bridges v. California, 328 U.S.
331 (1946).
277 Rex v. Davies, [1945] 1 K.B. 435. Cf., Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S.
402 (1918). Implicit in this rule is the notion that even judges of unimpeachable character may be
unduly influenced in their deliberations by out-of-court publications.
278 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
279 '"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive
evils. ... " Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
280 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
281 "Conceivably a campaign could be so managed and aimed at the sensibilities of a particular
judge and the matter pending before him as to cross the forbidden line." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 376 (1947) (dictum).
282 See Smotherman v. United States, 186 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1950).
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at times malicious, the courts must be prepared to withstand great pressure, since the
first amendment prevents an effective utilization of the contempt power to silence these
voices.
Although some jurists have expressed doubt that attributing stoical qualities to
judges results in a just resolution of litigated controversies, 28 3 nevertheless, the first-
amendment freedoms have generally prevailed over conflicting private and public
interests. Notwithstanding the threat to the impartial administration of justice, attempt-
ing to influence a judge's decision by public comment is now a constitutional right.
In the relatively few instances where a jury trial is afforded in a case involving a
segregation issue it remains an open question whether the immunity from contempt
proceedings is as extensive as in non-jury cases. Unprejudiced statements concerning a
pending case involving a jury trial would in all probability be held privileged under the
first amendment. 284 Prejudicial statements which are likely to influence jurors or pro-
spective jurors2S4 a should not be similarly privileged.28 5 A jury trial is not an election to
be decided by the free interchange of ideas in the market place. Inflammatory statements
concerning a pending segregation case which may be tried to a jury should be punished
as contempt. Litigants could be deprived of a fair hearing and an impartial jury if
prejudicial out-of-court publications are not prohibited by law.
Implementation of the segregation decisions by judicial decree creates a serious
first amendment problem when the decree enjoins interference with desegregation by
means of speech or writing. A nearly identical problem arises when those who are
bound by the decree are urged to violate it by one who is not bound. These difficulties
were highlighted by two significant segregation cases.
In Hoxie School Dist. v. Brewer286 the defendants, who had engaged in inflamma-
tory speech-making in an attempt forcefully to prevent integration, were enjoined from
"attempting to interfere with the lawful administration of the school district, from in-
timidating, threatening or attempting to visit harm on the plaintiffs to cause them to
violate the U.S. Constitution. '28 7 On appeal the injunction was upheld with the obser-
vation that no legitimate issue of free speech was raised.288 The conviction of segrega-
tionist John Kasper for violating an injunction prohibiting him from "further hindering,
obstructing or in any way interfering with the carrying out of the court's order, and
from picketing Clinton High School, either by words, acts, or otherwise," was affirmed
in Kasper v. Brittain.289 This injunction was criticized as being too broad, since advo-
cating the violation of an injunction is, in itself, supposedly protected by the first amend-
ment.290 The injunction was found to be valid, however, on the principle that no one
has a right to persuade others to violate the law. 29 '
Although the injunctions in the Hoxie and Kasper cases specifically prohibited con-
duct, including speech, which interfered with desegregation, there is no constitutionally-
288 Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 392 (1947).
284 See Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. Maryland, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 912 (1950).284a But this applies to particular citizens who may currently be on jury panel. See Hoffman v.
Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955) and
Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, 176 Kan. 101, 269 P.2d 435 (1954) where insurance companies
were held not liable on indirect contempt charges arising out of advertisements urging lower damage
awards by juries on the ground that the advertisements were not directed to a specific jury.
285 "The question whether they [the courts] can now deal with the radio stations or the press in
cases where the statements are inflamatory, false, or designed to intimidate, is not before us." Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc. v. Maryland, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d at 511 (1949).
286 137 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
287 Id. at 375.
288 Hoxie School Dist. v. Brewer, 238 F.2d 91, 102 (8th Cir. 1956).
289 245 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir. 1957).
290 AMERICAN CivIL LmERTms UNION, 37TH ANNUAL REPORT 80-81 (1957). "The Union con-
cluded that mere advocacy-in the Clinton case urging the ignoring of the law or judicial orders-
should not be prohibited."
291 245 F.2d at 95.
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significant difference when one is convicted for urging the violation of a decree which
does not, by its terms, prohibit him from speaking. This is implicit in the Kasper decision,
because if advocating the violation of an injunction had been privileged free speech,
specifically enjoining that advocacy would itself have violated the first amendment.
The constitutionality of contempt proceedings against those who advocate the viola-
tion of an injunction has been recognized in other contexts.292 Labor injunctions have
often been framed to prohibit verbal as well as non-verbal conduct.293 The use of the
labor injunction has been deplored by many on policy grounds, but, except in the case of
picketing, no impairment of free speech has been found in the application of this device
to verbal acts. An analogous principle is found in the rule that one who counsels the
violation of a statute may be subjected to criminal prosecution consistently with the
first amendment.
294
Until very recently there was prevailing judicial theory that the only possible
justification for restraining speech which criticized legal or political institutions rested
on the application of the clear and present danger test.2 9 5 Although this over-simplified
formula unfortunately became the basis for the analysis of many complex free-speech
cases, 2 9 6 the obvious necessity for a more flexible treatment of the problem led to a
reformulation of the test in Dennis v. United States.2 9 7 -29 9 "In each case [courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such in-
vasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Under this formula, speech
which directly impedes compliance with a decree ordering the desegregation of a state
institution should be punishable as contempt if the decree is valid and in accordance
with existing law.
It is clear then, that the first amendment confers no right to interfere with the
enforcement of the law. Certainly this is a more satisfactory and realistic analysis,
because freedom of speech and press does not include a personal or private right of
nullification or modification of existing law by individual citizens. The Constitution
provides adequate opportunity for one to voice his dissatisfaction with the present legal
order without urging violation of the law.
Although speech which actually interferes with or impedes compliance with a
desegregation decree should certainly be punishable by contempt proceedings, the
extent to which the first amendment protects those who simply advocate violation of a
judicial decree is now uncertain due to the decision of Yates v. United States.30 0 The
conviction of alleged communist conspirators for advocating the overthrow of the
government by force and violence was reversed because the instructions to the jury did
not charge that the advocacy must be of a kind calculated to incite persons to action. The
case involved an interpretation of the Smith Act30 ' rather than a constitutional issue,
yet the opinion is relevant to the desegregation problem because the free speech question
was clearly present in the court's considerations. 302 The decision rests on the distinction
292 Minerich v. United States, 29 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 843 (1929)
(address before a meeting of strikers urging the violation of a labor injunction).
293 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 70 F. Supp. 42 (D.D.C. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 330 U.S.. 258 (1947). Ex parte
Richards, 117 Fed. 658 (S.D.W. Va. 1902).
294 United States v. Miller, 233 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1956) (violation of Universal Military Training
Act urged).
295 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
296 "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter
for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Holmes ., dissenting in Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912).
297-299 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
300 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
501 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
302 In approaching the statutory interpretation issue the Court stated that "in doing so we
should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly
marked .. " 354 U.S. at 319.
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between the advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy inciting unlawful action. The
Court implied that the former is protected by the first amendment, but not the latter.3 0 3
As the opinion recognized, this distinction is subtle and often difficult to grasp.
30 4
The segregationists clearly have the right to urge the enforced separation of the
races through state action. Additionally, the first amendment guarantees the right to
express one's opinions on controversial subjects and even engage in oratory which stirs
strong emotion,3 05 unless imminent violence is threatened.30 6 On the contrary, counsel-
ing the actual violation of an injunction, as was done by John Kasper, trangresses the
boundaries of constitutionally-protected self-expression. If an intermediate position is
taken, as when a person advocates the necessity of violating a desegregation decree, a
difficult question is posed by Yates as to whether the speech is contemptuous incitement
to action or privileged advocacy of belief. The decision in each case may depend on a
number of factors such as the intention of the speaker, the provocative quality of the
ideas expressed, the mood of the listeners, and the manner of delivery. Admittedly,
none of these considerations would be relevant if it were possible to make an essential
psychological distinction between incitement and abstract propagandizing. The real
value of the distinction is that it provides a method of analysis; it avoids an arbitrary
mechanical formula for deciding cases.
Advocating state action which contravenes the Constitution is essentially similar
to advocating the overthrow of constitutional government by force; therefore, the
Yates rationale should apply equally to first-amendment cases arising in the context of
the desegregation problem. This doctrine is a significant refinement in constitutional
theory created in the unending process of reconciling individual freedom with the need
for public order and respect for law in a restless society.
C. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
Further legal sanctions which might possibly be used in the implementation of
school desegregation are to be found in the long line of federal statutes known as the
Civil Rights Acts. 3 0 7 The laws comprising this series, the first of which was enacted in
1866, were passed pursuant to the last clauses of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, which empower Congress to enact legislation enforcing the provisions of
the amendments. So far these statutes have been greatly restricted in their application
through the process of judicial interpretation,3 08 but there are six provisions, four civil3 09
303 "The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged
to do something now or in the future, rather than to merely believe something." Id. at 325-26.
304 Justice Holmes was cited for the proposition that in a sense, "Every idea is an incitement."
Id. at 327. This observation betrays the artificiality of the distinction between the advocacy of
activity and the advocacy of beliefs. In fact, every rational act has an idea as its stimulus. Most
people probably do not possess sufficient discernment to place ideas which they are only to think
about in a separate mental compartment from those upon which they are to act.
305 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
306 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
307 Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Act. of May 31, 1931, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, amended, Act
of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433; Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13; Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat.
335. Sometimes included in the list of Civil Rights Acts are the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866, 14
Stat. 50; Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 546. The remains of the Civil Rights Acts today are
found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-44, 1581, 1583, 1584 (1952), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a), 1981-92, 1944
(1952). In 1957 Congress slightly increased the laws, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(b) - (e), 1995 (Supp. V
1958), created the Civil Rights Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (Supp. V 1958), and took away the
President's power to use the Armed Forces when necessary to aid in the execution of judicial
processes issued under §§ 1981-83 and 1985-92 of Title 42, or to prevent the violation and enforce
the provisions of 1981-83 and 1985-94 of Title 42, Act of Sept. 9, 1957, § 122, 71 Stat. 637, repealing
Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 9, 14 Stat. 29, and Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, § 13, 16 Stat. 143.
308 E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1323 (1952), for a complete listing of authorities discussing
the treatment of the Civil Rights Acts by the Supreme Court, see EMERSON & HABER, POLrICAL AND
CrvIu RIGHTs IN THE UNrrm STATEs 47 (2nd ed. 1958).
309 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1)-(3), 1986 (1952).
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and two criminal,3 1 0 which provide possibilities of aid in the area of school desegrega-
tion. The Civil Rights Acts have been exhaustively treated in several recent legal
periodicals.3 1 ' Therefore, our treatment will be limited to a brief description of the
remedies contained in those six provisions.
The first civil remedy is found in section 1983 of Title 42 U.S.C. This statute im-
poses civil liability upon one who under color of state law deprives another of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Damages and equitable relief are the forms of redress available under this
section. However, the value of this statute is greatly limited by the requirement that
state action be involved in some way in the alleged deprivation of rights.
312
Section 1985 of Title 42 U.S.C. provides the second source of possible civil
remedies available to negro school children under the Civil Rights Acts. The terms of
this section, unlike those of section 1983, are not limited to defendants acting under
color of state law. The statute is divided into three subsections. The first subsection deals
with conspiracies to prevent by force, intimidation or threat any officer of the United
States from discharging his official duties. Subsection two covers conspiracies to obstruct
justice or to coerce parties, witnesses, or jurors. The third subsection holds the most
promise of aid in enforcing school desegregation. It provides one who has been the
intended object of a conspiracy to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, or
equal privileges and immunities under the laws, with an action for the recovery of
damages. Unlike section 1983, this section does not provide for an injunction.
Section 1985 is supplemented by section 1986. This section imposes civil liability
upon any person who has knowledge that one of the wrongs mentioned in section 1985
is about to be committed and who has the power to prevent its commission but refuses
or neglects to do so. The constitutionality of this provision was upheld by a federal
district court in Robeson v. Fanelli.313
Sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 U.S.C. provide criminal sanctions to discour-
age interference with public school desegregation, although neither section has been so
employed; section 241 provides for a maximum fine of $5,000 or imprisonment up to
ten years or both, where two or more persons conspire to deprive any citizen of the
free exercise of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Section 242 is concerned with any person who, while acting under color of
law, wilfully deprives another of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States. Violation of this section could result in a maximum
fine of $1,000 or imprisonment up to one year or both.
Thus far, these statutes have not been utilized in school desegregation situations.
Further, it would seem that under the second Brown opinion adequate relief can be
obtained without resorting to them. What role, if any, they will play in the implementa-
tion of desegregation remains to be determined.
M. COUNTERMEASURES
This section of our survey will examine the methods employed by some of the
southern states to arrest the impact of the Brown decision. The most important of these
are the gerrymandering of school districts, the closing of schools - usually with some
provision for other education for displaced pupils - and pupil assignment programs.
Supplementing these devices is a series of moves calculated to restrict the activities of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in assisting litigants
who seek desegregation through the courts.
310 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1952).
311 Substantive Civil Rights Under Federal Legislation, 3 RAcE REL. L. Rm'. 133 (1958);
Note, Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: The Contempt Power and the
Civil Rights Acts, 65 YALE LJ. 630 (1956); Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NoTRE
DAmE LAW. 303 (1959).
812 E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. For a thorough discussion of the meaning of the term
"state action," see State Action, I RAcE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956).
318 94 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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A. GERRYMANDERING OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS
It has been proposed that segregation be preserved by a re-alignment of school
districts, drawing them along lines which would reflect the racial character of the neigh-
borhoods involved. In theory, any persons along a fringe area could be sent to the
"proper" school through application of the pupil assignment law, which does not
require children to attend integrated schools.
The advocates of these programs have some precedent to support the position
that they will not be struck down by the courts. In Colegrove v. Green,' the Supreme
Court refused to undertake the task of re-mapping the congressional districts of Illinois.
A federal district court recently refused to declare invalid as a denial of due process of
law an Alabama statute which re-arranged the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee to the
detriment of Negroes residing there.2 The court held that the action taken was within
the state's power to determine and define its municipal boundaries, and therefore the
motives of the legislature were not relevant. Colegrove, however, was decided upon
narrower ground. Justice Frankfurter (writing for himself, Justice Reed and Justice
Burton) held that the case involved a political question, and cited the traditional
refusal of the Supreme Court to interfere in such matters. Historically, this refusal has
been based upon discretion rather than a rigid rule of law. It is possible that the Court
may decide to address itself to the question if it finds racial discrimination beneath the
redistricting plans. The problem does involve "political questions," but it lacks the
element of partisan politics which Justice Frankfurter found repugnant to judicial inter-
vention in Colegrove.3 Moreover, the federal courts are already active in this area.
In Webb v. School District,4 a Kansas school district had been gerrymandered to
produce segregation in the public schools despite laws forbidding racial discrimination.
The court declared the redistricting invalid and ordered all students into one school.
Even if redistricting of this kind were permissible, there would be no way to keep
the races "in their district." It has long been settled that city ordinances which
require separation of the races in certain designated areas are unconstitutional.
Moreover, the state cannot enforce racially restrictive covenants. 5 Persons in the
"wrong" districts might be excluded by operation of the pupil assignment laws, but, as
is seen from the discussion above, the courts are closely watching the application of
these laws and will not permit any placements made upon the basis of race alone.
It is therefore predicted that redistricting along racial lines will not permanently
prevent integration. It may postpone it for an indefinite period and cause expense and
delay; but it will not fulfill a goal of total and permanent segregation.
B. SCHOOL CLOSING AND TUITION GRANT PLANS.
1. Closing Plans.
Some form of school closing legislation has now been enacted in ten states: Ala-
bama,6 Arkansas, 7 Florida,8 Georgia,9 Louisiana,
10 Mississippi," North Carolina,' 2
1 328 U.S. 549 (1946); accord, South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
2 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958). But cf. Holland v. Board of
Public Instruction, 258 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958).
a The question is even further from the traditional notion of the "political" question. See
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
4 167 Kan. 395, 206 P.2d 1066 (1949).
5 Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Futhermore, a state court cannot entertain an action
for damages for breach of such a covenant. Barrows v. Jackson, 345 U.S. 632 (1953).
6 ALA. CODE tit. 52, §§ 61(1)-(9) (Supp. 1958).
7 ARK. AcTs 1959, No. 151.
8 FLA. STAT. ANNw. § 230.232 (1956).
9 GA. AcTs 1959, No. 7, 1.
10 LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 17:336 (Supp. 1958).
11 MISS. CODE ANrw. § 6232-21 (Supp. 1958).
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-261 to 273 (Supp. 1957).
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South Carolina,1 3 Texas,1 4 and Virginia.1 5 Four general types of plans have been
adopted, but the statutes are essentially similar. The real question is whether the law
will tolerate conduct that allows the states to evade the Supreme Court decision in Brown
by permitting only segregated schools to operate. If all these statutes were put into
operation at the same time, the injury would be not to "states' rights" or to "federal
supremacy," but to thousands of southern children.
Probably the least complicated and simplest plan is that requiring that the schools
be closed if military forces or other personnel are used at any school by federal
authority. Under the Florida statute,' 6 the closing is automatic and the school cannot be
reopened until the forces are withdrawn. Provision is made for transfer of pupils to
other schools if the parents request it. Compulsory attendance laws are suspended or
pupils are regarded as being present and in school. Texas' 7 provides for closing of the
schools by the school board with proper jurisdiction if either the board or the governor
finds that danger of violence exists which can only be remedied by the use of military
force. The schools are to remain closed until the military forces withdraw and the
school board certifies to the governor that the school no longer needs to be closed.
Pupils may be transferred to open schools, but attendance requirements are suspended
during the period of closing.
A third state to enact this type of legislation was Virginia.18 This act, similar to
the Florida statute, was invalidated by the highest court of the state in Harrison v. Day,19
and by a lower federal court in James v. Almond.20 These decision will be discussed
below.
The latest states to enact this type of legislation were Georgia
2 ' and Arkansas. 22
The Georgia act permits the governor to close the schools when he deems it necessary
to preserve "the good order, peace and dignity of the State."123 The act further provides
for transfer of the pupils from the closed schools to other schools, but if it is found that
any child cannot be transferred, "he [the governor] shall provide for an educational
grant from State and local funds, as authorized by the Act approved February 6, 1956,
(Ga. L. 1956, p. 6) to each such pupil who cannot be so transferred .... "24 An
equivalent measure approved at the same time provides for closing of institutions of
the university system by the governor under the same standards. 25 So far, it has been
the only state to direct much attention to institutions of higher learning, though South
Carolina is also taking steps in that direction.
2 6
A second type of statute is one authorizing the closing of public schools under
other specified circumstances. 2 7 Louisiana 28 provides for closing where enforced in-
tegration has been ordered or is imminent. Georgia, in addition to its newly-enacted
legislation, has previously passed a series of statutes that would close the schools and
13 S.C. CODE §§ 21-230, 21-247 to 247.7 (Supp. 1958).
14 Tar. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2906-1 (Supp. 1958).
15 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-232.1 to 232.6.
16 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230-233 (Supp. 1958).
17 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2906-1 (Supp. 1958).
18 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-188.3 to -188.12 (Supp. 1958).
19 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
20 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959).
21 GA. AcTs 1959, No. 7.
22 Aiux. AcTs 1959, No. 151. This act was upheld 4-3 by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. N.Y.
Times, April 28, 1959, p. 34M, col. 1,
23 GA. AcTs 1959, No. 7, 1.
24 Id.§6.
25 GA. AcTs 1959, No. 8.
26 By further act of the legislature, no one may be admitted to the undergraduate division of the
University of Georgia after his twenty-first year or the the graduate division if more than twenty-five.
However, some important exceptions are made: (1) teachers, (2) students found by the Board of
Regents to possess ability and fitness justifying their further education at public expense, and (3)
persons in military service who are unable to make application. GA. AcTs 1959, No. 1Q (Approved
by the governor on February 4, 1959).
27 E. g. Miss. CODE ANN. § 6232-21 (Supp. 1958).
28 LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 17:336 (Supp. 1958).
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under certain circumstances allow tuition grants.2 9 The other statutes are similar in
purpose, but the procedure is somewhat varied.
The third method - withdrawal of public funds - has been adopted by few states.
The Georgia General Appropriations Act of 195730 limited state school funds to
segregated schools. A recent Georgia bill3 ' would limit powers of taxation given to
independent school systems to segregated schools. Louisiana has withdrawn public
funds from integrated schools. 32 South Carolina makes the withdrawal contingent upon
any pupil being transferred to another school by a court order.33 A Texas statute
provides that any school district whose board of trustees shall abolish segregated educa-
tion without a prior vote by the electors approving integration shall be ineligible for
accreditation and certain special financial assistance.
34
A fourth method employed by the states has been to repeal or modify the existing
compulsory school attendance laws. Most of the modification laws have already been
shown. The only purpose this type of legislation seems to have is to allow the different
closing plans to operate effectively and to grant the pupil assignment plans a broad scope
of operation.
This gives a brief review of the state statutes in this area. It remains for us to
consider the constitutionality of these plans. For the time being, the question of tuition
grants will be laid to one side, as that raises a separate set of issues - by far the most
difficult.
The Supreme Court said in Cooper v. Aaron:3 5
In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in
school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown
case, can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive
or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for
segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously'.
This statement, it would seem, supplies the answer to the validity of the school-closure
plans.
The federal court, in James v. Almond,3 invalidated the Virginia Closing Act and
on the same day the statute met a like fate in the highest state court.3 7 The James case
clearly stated the principles on which it was based - that closing of non-segregated
schools because of attempted integration is both a violation of equal protection and a
denial of due process to one who is willing to attend an integrated school. Whether a
state must maintain a public educational system is a matter for state determination. In
the course of its opinion the district court said:
.... [N]o one public school or grade in Virginia may be closed to avoid the effect
of the law of the land as interpreted by the Supreme Court, while the state permits
other public schools or grades to remain open at the expense of the taxpayers .... 38
The statutes and the action of the . . . [state officials] thereunder constitute a
clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution.38
In the event the State of Virginia withdraws from the business of education of
its children, and the local governing bodies assume this responsibility, the same prin-
ciples with respect to equal protection of the laws would be controlling as to that
particular county or city. While the county or city, directly or indirectly, maintains
and operates a school system with the use of public funds, or participates by arrange-
ment or otherwise in the management of such school system, no one public school
or grade in the county or city may be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land
while other public schools or grades remain open at the expense of the taxpayers.
Such schemes or devices looking to the cut off of funds for schools or grades affected
29 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-801 to -811 (Supp. 1957).
30 See I RAcE REL. L. REP. 421 (1956).
31 HIB No. 5, passed by the Georgia Senate and House in February 1959.
32 LA. Rav. STAT. §§ 331-34 (Supp. 1956).
33 S.C. CoD § 21-2 (Supp. 1956).
34 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 2900(a) (Supp. 1958).
35 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
36 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959).
37 Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
38 170 F. Supp. at 337.
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by the mixing of races, or the closing or elimination of specific grades in such schools,
are evasive tactics which have no standing under the law.39
This opinion is in harmony with the attitude of the Supreme Court. The states are put
in a position of choosing between integrated schools or no schools at all. If other
federal courts adopt and use the reasoning of James, they will have answered the
dilemma that faced the Dallas School Board in Dallas Independent School Dist. v.
Edgar.40 There the school board petitioned the court, stating in substance that by court
decree they had been ordered to integrate, but if they did so, the State of Texas would
withdraw school funds and the school officers would be subject to penal sanctions.
They therefore asked for a declaratory judgment to determine their rights as affected by
the local laws and court decrees. It was held that the school board, as a creature of
the state, could not maintain suit against the state or complain of unconstitutional state
legislation, and there was no claim or justifiable controversy giving the federal court
jurisdiction. The suit was therefore dismissed. This decision seems questionable. Certainly
a person faced with state penal sanctions for complying with federal law must have some
kind of federal remedy. The James rationale would, perhaps, provide such a remedy.
Under the James rationale, if funds were withdrawn, a proper suit by a taxpayer or
board officer against whom penal sanctions had been taken would result in invalidation
of the statute.
The James case does not attempt to answer the question, however, of what could
happen if the state withdrew from the field of education. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia, in Harrison v. Day,41 said that in Virginia this could not be done. This case
is mainly a study of the interpretation of Article IX of the Virginia Constitution, dealing
with public education and instruction. Section 129 requires that free schools be main-
tained; section 140 prohibits mixed schools, and section 141 provides, in certain in-
stances, that the general assembly may appropriate funds for education of children in
private schools. Virginia, by special legislation in 1956,42 closed all integrated schools.
The court held, two justices dissenting, that the destruction of section 140 did not
invalidate the remaining sections of Article IX. Therefore, section 129 was still the
organic law of the state and imposed a duty to operate the schools. Section 141 does
not permit the State Board of Education to give grants at the expense of public free
schools.
2. Tuition and Private Aid Grants.
Whether Harrison will be followed in other states - the constitutional provisions
affecting public education differ widely - remains to be determined. As regards the
federal constitution, while Cooper v. Aaron43 and James v. Almond44 indicate that a
partial closing of the public schools is not permissible, a complete state-wide closing
would not run afoul of any principle thus far enunciated. No southern state, however,
has yet been willing to pay the price of complete withdrawal from the function of edu-
cation. We will now consider two devices that attempt to maintain some state interest
in education, consistent with the abolition of the public schools.
By recent constitutional amendment,45 North Carolina has established a system of
grants to meet educational expenses at private non-sectarian schools. The system is
confined to children who are ordered to attend integrated schools against the wishes of
their parents, in cases where there is no reasonable and practicable way of reassigning
them to segregated schools. By the terms of the implementing statutes, the school must
be private and non-sectarian as required by the amendments and approval must bi
obtained from the Board of Education in accordance with prescribed statutory man-
dates: 46 (1) the private schools must have a curriculum comparable to the public
39 Id. at 338.
40 255 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1958).
41 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
42 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-188.3 to -188.5 (Supp. 1958).
48 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
44 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D.Va. 1959).
45 N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 12. (Adopted in 1956).
46 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-225 to -257 (Supp. 1957).
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school system; (2) private teachers are to be governed by the same provisions as are
public teachers and must meet the same qualifications; and (3) the state board of
education may regulate and supervise all non-public schools serving children of second-
ary age or younger. An exception is made regarding religious instruction. 47 It is further
provided that: "Payment of educational expense grants for or on behalf of any child
attending such a school shall not vest in the State of North Carolina, the State Board
of Education or any agency or political subdivision of the State any supervision or
control whatever over such non-public schools, or any responsibility for their conduct
or operation. '48 It seems clear that the state is attempting to maintain control over the
private schools while at the same time disclaiming control in order to avoid a finding
of state action. There is little difference between the private and public schools under
the statute except in name. The state is actively engaged in the project, both in its
support and in its continuing control. 49 Such a scheme is probably evasive and, there-
fore, within the doctrine enunciated in Cooper v. Aaron.50 There seems to be no practical
difference between the North Carolina plan and the discredited Nashville plan,51 for
both would create segregated schools by majority will in disregard of minority rights.
This raises a question as to whether a state can establish a tuition-grant system that
is immune from constitutional objection. In an effort to create such a system, the
Louisiana legislature in the regular 1958 session enacted a provision creating "Education
Expense Grants for Private Education. 52 Essentially, it provides a system of education
expense grants for children attending non-sectarian non-public schools where no
racially-segregated public school is provided. The purpose, enunciated in section I,53 is
to provide schools which conform to the "custom and feelings of the people of each
community." The grants are available to any child of any race who qualifies under the
statutory provisions. But in an attempt to remove any possibility of state action it is
further stated, "such grants as are provided herein are made to and for the child, and
not to the institution furnishing the educational facilities."
'54
The grants are available to any child whose parents object to his attending an in-
tegrated school. No segregated school is provided and the private non-sectarian school 55
is approved by the state board of education. 50 However, the latter section is careful to
provide that the state board only approves the schools and has no power or responsibility
for their conduct or operation.
The act on its face appears to be constitutional under the prevailing fourteenth
amendment state action concept. The public school system would remain and the private
schools would operate under no more state control than was heretofore in effect. It
must be conceded that a school, like a corporation, is subject to some degree of control,
because the state has a substantial interest in the welfare of its people as affected by
either institution. As seen in Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library,57 an institution formally
a private institution, though in fact a state agency, is subject to the same restraints as
the state itself would be, but the fact that some state funds are directed to a private
institution will not, without more, make that institution a "state agency." 58
47 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-255 (Supp. 1957).
48 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-285 (Supp. 1957).
49 See Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
50 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
51 Held unconstitutional in Kelley v. Board of Educ. of Nashville, 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn.
1958).
52 LA. REv. STAT. §§ 391.1-.16 (Supp. 1958).
53 LA. Rav. STAT. § 391.1 (Supp. 1958).
54 Ibid. This contention, if valid, would seem to undermine the constitutionality of the require-
ment that the school attended be non-sectarian. The constitution forbids invidious distinctions be-
tween children on the basis of religion as surely as it requires such distinctions between schools.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
55 Id. § 391.2.
56 Id. § 391.12.
57 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
58 Norris v. Mayor of Baltimore, 78 Fed. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948); see Eaton v. Board of
Managers, 164 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
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May a state grant public money to private individuals to finance their attending
private schools? An attack on such a grant would probably come through the due
process clause, charging that the use of the funds was an unconstitutional deflection of
public revenue for private purposes. This is similar, however, to the situation in Everson
v. Board of Educ.59 There the reimbursement of parents of parochial school children for
money spent in transportation to and from school was held not to be a violation of due
process of law. Much earlier, the state's right to supply free text books in private and
parochial schools was also upheld.60 Both of these cases centered around the concept of
"public purpose." Public funds were directed to private individuals or institutions, but for
a public purpose - education of the state's people or aid to those facilities that directly
affect education.
In the abstract, then, there would seem to be no constitutional objection to replac-
ing or supplementing the public school system by tuition plans. The question, however,
is whether the courts would consider such a plan in the abstract, or would condemn
them in the language of Aaron as "evasive schemes for segregation." Such a condemna-
tion would invoke some extension of the traditional concepts of state action, but in view
of Terry v. Adams,61 this is by no means out of the question.
3. Leasing Public Facilities
Some school-closing plans provide for the leasing of school facilities to private
groups. In one case a leasing arrangement under one of these provisions was held to
violate an existing segregation decree. Absent such a decree, the leasing plans have not
yet been tested in the courts. However, schools operating under such plans will probably
meet the same fate as other state or state agency-owned facilities that have been leased
to private concerns.6 2 One of the earliest leasing cases was Lawrence v. Hancock.63 The
city of Montgomery, Alabama, by bond issue, raised funds and built a swimming pool
which was then leased to a private concern. The lease provided only nominal considera-
tion for use of the property,6 4 and the lessee was required to apply his profits to main-
tenance and improvement of the pool. It was held that if the pool was to be operated, the
city would have to operate it itself, or if leased, the city would have to see to it that it
was operated without discrimination. 65 This doctrine has been held applicable to state
parks,66 and to a cafeteria located in a county courthouse.6 7 These cases rest upon two
basic propositions: (1) all persons have the right to use these facilities without dis-
crimination; and (2) such right cannot be abridged by a leasing arrangement in which
ownership is retained by the state. What the state cannot do directly, it cannot do in-
directly. The purpose of the leasing arrangement is apparently immaterial; the court
directs its attention to the results of the arrangement.6 8
59 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60 Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
61 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
62 The states and their agencies have resorted to the lease arrangement to escape the consequences
of court decisions holding that any classification based upon race is unconstitutional, whether it be in
regard to a golf course, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), reversing per curiam 223
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955), parks, Department of Conservation & Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1956), beaches and swimming pools, City of Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.
1956); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), or busses
and streetcars, Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala.), afl'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
63 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W.Va. 1948).
64 The lease required a $1.00 per year rental fee.
65 The case turned on the assertion that the negro plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the
laws under the fourteenth amendment by being denied admission to the pool. The court emphasized
that the city could not escape its responsibilities by a lease which purported to divest the city of all
control.
66 Department of Conservation & Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956).
67 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956).
68 See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
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Federal courts have refused to enjoin the bona fide sale of a public swimming pool69
and a public golf course to a private individual.70 In the swimming pool case, the
court based its decision on the rule that a state is not required by the Constitution to
operate such facilities.
Various provisions have been made for the use of abandoned public facilities. South
Carolina has made it possible for the property to be transferred to trustees for use as a
community center.71 Arkansas allows the lease and sale of public recreation facilities, 72
and Mississippi has provided for the similar disposition of school property.73 As long
as the state retains ownership, and the plant leased is used for the same purposes, the
Hancock rationale would apply.7 4 Thus, it does not appear that leasing provides any
relief for the southern states. The alternative, closing all facilities, parks, schools, pools,
etc., certainly maintains segregation - Negroes are excluded from "white" facilities -
but the price is high.
C. PUPIL ASSIGNMENT AND PLACEMENT ACTS.
As contrasted with "school closing plans," the "pupil placement or assignment
plans" may offer a partially effective legal recourse to southern segregationists. They
are positive acts which may allow the states employing them to forestall massive integra-
tion. Nine states have enacted school placement or pupil assignment acts: Alabama, 75
Arkansas, 76 Florida, 77 Mississippi, 78 North Carolina, 79 South Carolina,80 Tennessee, 8 '
Texas8 2 and Virginia.8 3 For purposes of discussion, the Florida act will be examined in
some detail, because it is both concise and exhaustive. This measure was recently upheld
by a federal district court8 4 which found it to be similar to the Alabama statute upheld
by the Supreme Court in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.8 5 The Florida act is
typical of legislation in this area, but variations from state to state deserve examination.
Section one of the Florida act confers upon county boards of public instruction
exclusive authority to enroll children within the schools of their county. "The authority
of each such board in the matter of public schools shall be full and complete."86 Section
two is the heart of the assignment plan and for that reason is stated in full:
In the exercise of the authority conferred by subsection (1) . . . upon the county
boards of public instruction each such board shall provide for the enrollment of
pupils in the respective public schools located within such county so as to provide for
the orderly and efficient administration of such public schools, the effective instruction
of the pupils therein enrolled, and the health, safety, education and general welfare
of such pupils. In the exercise of such authority the board shall prescribe school
attendance areas and school bus transportation routes and may adopt such reasonable
rules and regulations as in the opinion of the board shall best accomplish such pur-
09 Tompkins v. Greensboro, 162 F. Supp. 549 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
70 Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957), affirming 149 F. Supp. 562 (M.D.N.C.
1957). For an interesting epilogue to this case, see State v. Cook, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846
(1958), where a plaintiff in the federal action was subsequently convicted in a state prosecution for
trespassing on the property in question.
71 S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-330 (Supp. 1958).
72 ARK. AcTs 1959, act. 224.
73 Miss. CoNsT. art. 8 § 213-B.
74 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n., 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated, 347 U.S.
971 (1954).
75 ALA. CODE tit. 52, §§ 61(1)-(9) (Supp. 1958).
76 ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1519 to -1525 (Supp. 1957); Ark. Acts 1959, No. 461.
77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.232 (1956).
78 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 6334-01 to -08 (Supp. 1958).
79 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176 to -179 (Supp. 1957).
80 S.C. CODE §§ 21-230, 21-247 to -247.7 (Supp. 1958).
81 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1741 to -1763 (Supp. 1958).
82 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2901(a) (Supp. 1958).
83 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-232.1 to -232.16 (Supp. 1958).
84 Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction, 170 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
85 358 U.S. 101 (1958), affirming per curiam 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
86 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.232 (Supp. 1956).
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poses. The county boards of public instruction shall prescribe appropriate rules
and regulations to implement the provisions of this subsection and other applicable
laws of this state and to that end may use all means legitimate, necessary and proper
to promote the health, safety, good order, education and welfare of the public
school and the pupils enrolling therein or seeking to enroll therein. In the accomplish-
ment of these objectives the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the board may
include, but be not limited to, provisions for the conduct of such uniform tests as
may be deemed necessary or advisable in classifying the pupils according to intellectual
ability and scholastic proficiency to the end that there will be established in each
school within the county an environment of equality among pupils of like qualifications
and academic attainments. In the preparation and conduct of such, tests and in
classifying the pupils for assignment to the schools which they will attend, the board
shall take in account such sociological, psychological and like intangible social
scientific factors as will prevent, as nearly as practicable, any condition of socio-
economic class consciousness among the pupils attending any given school in order
that each pupil may be afforded an opportunity for a normal adjustment to his en-
vironment and receive the highest standard of instruction within his ability to under-
stand and assimilate. In designating the school to which pupils may be assigned there
shall be taken into consideration the available facilities and teaching capacity of the
several schools within the county, the effect of the admission of new students upon
established academic programs, the suitability of established curriculum to the students
enrolled or to be enrolled in a given school, the scholastic aptitude, intelligence,
mental energy or ability of the pupil applying for admission and the psychological,
moral, ethical and cultural background and qualifications of the pupil applying for
admission as compared with other pupils previously assigned to the school in which
admission is sought. It is the intention of the legislature to hereby delegate to the
local school boards all necessary and proper administrative authority to prescribe
such rules and regulations and to make such decisions and determinations as may
be requisite for such purposes.87
By comparison, the South Carolina act is not as extensive, since it merely provides
that the school trustees shall have the power to "transfer any pupil from one school to
another so as to promote the best interests of education and determine the school with-
in the district in which any pupil shall enroll."8 8 It appears from a reading of the
Florida statute that the same factors upon which the Supreme Court based its decision in
Brown - i.e., sociological and psychological considerations - are now being used to
defeat the impact of the Court's ruling. On the other hand, it is doubtful, in the light
of Adkins v. School Board of City of Newport News,8 9 that the South Carolina statute
would be upheld. It prescribes no reasonable standard or guide on which assignment
can be made. The basis of assignment would presumably be race alone.
Section 3 of the Florida act deals with the procedure by which children are assigned
to schools. Section 3(a) provides that the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis shall apply to the proper school officials. If enrollment is refused, an appeal may
be taken to the county board. The board may deny enrollment if suitable grounds exist
under section 2. It should be noted that section 2 does not limit the board to the
methods and tests specifically enumerated. 0o Section 3 (b) allows an appeal to the State
Board of Education. The remaining provisions of the act allow the board to employ
necessary legal counsel, conduct appropriate studies, and appoint citizen committees
to aid in the study of school problems. Elaborate standards for pupil placement, coupled
with cumbersome and involved procedures for administrative review, are characteristic
of the placement statutes. Final judicial determination may be had only by appeal
through the several levels of the court system.
There are a few differences worth noting in some of the statutes. Alabama provides
that no child is required to attend a school in which the races are commingled, if there
is objection and notice given by the parent. The child who turns down integrated public
education is entitled to any aid authorized by law.9 1 Adverse rulings from the board are
87 Ibid.
88 S.C. CODE § 21-230(9) (Supp. 1958).
89 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.232 (Supp. 1958). "If the board shall find that such child is entitled to
be enrolled."
91 ALA. CODE tit., 52 § 61(8) (Supp. 1958).
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appealable to a court of equity, and a jury trial may be obtained in accordance with the
equity practice of the state.92 Arkansas has passed a similar measure.93 Mississippi has
established a Board of Trustees to make assignments, giving to the school principals thd
authority to make temporary assignments in proper casesY4 An appeal will lie to the
county board of education,9 5 and from there to the circuit court, sitting with a jury.96
Tennessee provides for appeal first to the court of chancery, then to the court of
appeals or the supreme court.97 Three states, South Carolina, Tennessee, and North
Carolina, declare that each placement or assignment is upon an individual basis, thus
precluding class actions testing the rights of many students at once. The South Carolina
act reads: "When individual children of school age are involved in a matter in con-
troversy, the case of each child shall be heard and disposed of separately. s98 Tennessee
has enacted a similar provision.9 9
A class action was instituted in North Carolina on behalf of certain negro children
to enforce a statute' 0 0 providing that application for reassignment could be made by any
parent or guardian. The court held, in Joyner v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ.,10 1 that
such an action could not be maintained, since, by the language of the statute, only the
parent can apply on behalf of his own child or children, and each action must be
prosecuted only by the interested parent. Furthermore, it has been held that no parent
can challenge the assignment of other children on the ground that such assignment was
not made in the best interests of his own child. Thus, where certain white parents
brought a class action protesting assignment of colored children to the various schools
to which their children had been assigned, their suit was dismissed.' 02 The court held
that they were not "persons aggrieved" as contemplated by the statute; to give them
the right to be heard would render school administration impossible. A federal district
court has found the administrative procedure required by the North Carolina placement
statute to be adequate and constitutionally valid.103
Two early state assignment plans were struck down by federal courts in the cases
of Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush'04 (Louisiana) and Adkins v. School Bd. of New-
port News'0 5 (Virginia). As an introduction to a fuller discussion of these cases, it
might be noted that neither statute was artfully drawn, or consistent with principles
enunciated in Brown.
The Louisiana statute was an attempt to maintain segregation in the public schools
as an incident of state police power. The statute read: "this provision [establishing
segregated schools] is made in the exercise of the State police power to promote and
protect public health, morals, better education and the peace and good order in the
state and not because of race."' 0 6 Pursuant to this and a companion statute, 107 segrega-
tion in the schools was ordered. The court found both acts unconstitutional, holding that
state police power cannot serve as a guide for continuing racial segregation. The place-
ment provisions provided no standard for administration, but were based purely upon
race.108
92 Id. § 61(9).
93 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1525 (Supp. 1957).
94 Miss. CODE ANN. § 6334-01 (Supp. 1958). Nothing is said in the statute with respect to the
duration of a "temporary" assignment.
95 Id. § 6334-04.
96 Id. § 6334-05.
97 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1759 (Supp. 1958).
98 S.C. CODE § 21-247.2 (Supp. 1958).
99 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1741, -1761 (Supp. 1958).
100 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-178 (Supp. 1957).
101 244 N.C. 164, 92 S.E.2d 795 (1956).
102 Applications for Reassignment of Pupils, 247 N.C. 413, 101 S.E.2d 359 (1958).
103 Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 164 F. Supp. 853 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
104 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
105 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
106 LA. AcTs 1954, No. 555, § 1.
107 LA. AcTs 1954, No. 556, § 1.
108 Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
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The Virginia Pupil Placement Plan of 1956109 fared no better. The two essential
elements of that act were the criteria used for assigning children to a school and the
administrative remedy available if parents were dissatisfied with placement. Assignments
by the Pupil Placement Board were to be based, among other factors, upon what were
deemed to be the best interests of the child and other children in the school, intangible
social factors and other relevant matters that might affect the efficient operation of the
school. 110 Section four of this act was unique in that all school children presently en-
rolled were to remain in the schools they were attending unless good cause could be
shown for reassignment. The administrative remedy was designed to be cumbersome and,
by practical operation, of little value. When the act was submitted to a federal court test,
the first stage of the remedy was found by the court to consume 105 days to a final
decision by the governor. The second stage required the litigant to argue his case through
the entire state court system. If the whole process were to have begun in September, it
could not have been completed before the end of the school year. It was held that the
negro litigant was not required to exhaust this procedure before resorting to the federal
courts."' The court concluded that the act was not a good faith attempt to fulfill the
mandate of Brown, but was an attempt to maintain segregation.
Kelly v. Board of Educ. of Nashville1 2 presented an analogous situation. The city
board of education submitted a plan to the court which would have established three
separate schools and would not have required integration. There would have been in each
district the usual segregated schools as well as an integrated one. A federal district court
held that minority rights could not be so made to depend upon the consent of the majori-
ty, nor could a Negro be denied admission to a white school because of his race. The net
effect of the plan would have been to continue segregation. The Tennessee Pupil
Assignment Act 13 was brought before the court, but the court declined to pass upon its
constitutionality, and noted that nothing in that act is inconsistent with a policy of
continued segregation.
Two significant decisions holding assignment acts to be valid on their face were
Carson v. Warlick"1 4 (North Carolina), and Shuttleworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ."15
(Alabama). In Warlick, only two questions were before the court: exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the constitutionality of the North Carolina Pupil Enroll-
ment Act. 116 The complainants had filed joint petitions for admission of their children,
an improper procedure under the language of the statute."17 The court therefore found
that administrative remedies were not exhausted. However, it was further urged that the
statute by its very terms was invalid, in particular sections 115-177, which required en-
rollment "so as to provide the orderly and efficient administration of such public schools,
the effective instruction of pupils therein enrolled, and the health, safety, and welfare of
such pupils." The court could find no patent insufficiency in the standards when the
board was given fact-finding and administrative functions to perform. In describing these
functions the court said:
Somebody must enroll the pupils in the schools. They cannot enroll themselves; and
we can think of no one better qualified to undertake the task than the officials of the
schools, and the school boards having the schools in charge. It is to be presumed
that these will obey the law, observe the standards prescribed by the legislature, and
avoid the discrimination on account of race which the Constitution forbids. Not
until they have been applied and have failed to give relief should the courts be asked
to interfere in school administration. As said by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299,..
109 VA. ACrs 1956, ch. 70.
11o VA. AcTs 1956, ch. 70, § 3.
Ill Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
112 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
113 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1741 to -1763 (Supp. 1958).
114 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
115 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
116 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176 to -179 (Supp. 1957).
117 Joyner v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., 244 N.C. 164, S.E.2d 795 (1956).
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School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action
of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles.118
The court concluded that "the federal courts should not condone dilatory tactics or eva-
sion on the part of state officials in according to citizens... their rights . . .; but it is
for the state to prescribe the administrative procedure to be followed so long as this does
not violate constitutional requirements ... .
The Alabama requirements are very similar to those of the Florida statute. The
Alabama School Placement Law of 1955120 requires consideration of various factors,
including the psychological qualification of the child for the type of teaching and
association involved; the physical effect upon the pupil of attendance at a particular
school; the possibility or threat of friction or disorder among pupils or others; the
possibility of breaches of the peace or ill-will or economic retaliation within the com-
munity; the maintenance or severance of established social and psychological relation-
ships with other pupils and with teachers. The constitutionality of this law was upheld
per curiam by the Supreme Court: "The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment
is affirmed upon the limited grounds on which the district court rested its decision, 162
F. Supp. 372, 384."121 Page 384 contains the quotation from the Warlick case on en-
rollment of pupils, and concludes by stating that the law is constitutional upon its face,
as it provides administrative machinery for maintaining an orderly school system, and
the court must presume that it will be administered to qualify pupils upon individual
merit and not on the basis of race. "If not, in some future proceeding it is possible that
it may be declared unconstitutional in its application. The responsibility rests primarily
upon the local school boards, but ultimately upon all the people of the state.'
22
Some difficulty has arisen in defining the proper scope of intervention by a federal
court into the affairs of a local school board. Board of Education of St. Mary's County
v. Groves,12s while conceding that a court should not take the plan for integration out of
the school board's hands, establishes that, in addition to determining whether the plan
is made in good faith, it must also determine whether it is in all aspects reasonable and
whether in certain individual situations exceptions should be made.
124
If pupil assignment legislation is valid on its face, plaintiffs refused admission must
show that they could not have been refused upon legitimate criteria stated in the act. 12 5
Courts have carefully scrutinized criteria upon which negro children are denied ad-
mission to schools under such laws, to insure that race is not the inarticulated reason
for denying Negroes admission to white schools. 12 6 Refusal to admit negro students
because one or two negro children among many whites would feel a "sense of isolation,"
and because "peculiar circumstances" would lead to "racial conflicts and grave ad-
ministrative problems," was not permitted in School Bd. 'v. Beckett.
127
In the most thorough case in this area thus far, Thompson v. County School Bd.
128
the court examined the board's rejection of thirty negro applicants on five grounds.
Twenty-five of the pupils were refused on a basis of attendance area (proximity of
home to school), academic accomplishment, and overcrowding in certain schools (white
children were apparently refused transfers on the same grounds). These criteria were
118 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956).
119 Id. at 729.
120 ALA. CoDr tit. 52, §§ 61(l)-(9) (Supp. 1958).
121 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
122 162 F. Supp. 372, 384 (N.D. Ala. 1958).
123 261 F. 2d 527 (4th Cir. 1958).
124 See also Slade v. Board of Education of Hartford County, 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1958).
125 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D.Ala.), aff'd per curiam,
358 U.S. 101 (1958).
126 Thompson v. County School Bd., 159 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd, 252 F. 2d 929
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
127 260 F. 2d 18, 19 (4th Cir. 1958).
128 166 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Va. 1958), aff'd in part sub nom. Hamm v. County School Bd. 263
F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1959).
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upheld. Another child was refused on the basis of "psychological problems"; the court
doubted the propriety of this standard because it could be closely connected with race.
However the board's decision was upheld because the pupil's academic achievement was
so low that his success in a school with appreciably higher standards was considered un-
likely. The remaining four pupils were turned down because of an "adaptability" factor.
The court rejected this standard, holding that it was clearly based on race. Both sides
appealed the decision; the Fourth Circuit affirmed the four admissions ordered by the
district court, but has deferred consideration of the twenty-six denials that were upheld
pending further examination of the relevant circumstances.
12 9- 18 1
The psychological factors mentioned in these cases probably have some factual
basis. As the Thompson case indicates, any immediate large-scale shift in the racial make-
up of the southern schools seems unlikely. In the areas where attempts to furnish
"separate but equal" education to negro children have been made, segregated negro
schools are geographically closer to negro residential areas than white schools are,
and proximity seems to be a legitimate standard for assignments if it is not applied
discriminatorily. There is little doubt that distance factors will present difficulties to the
few negro children who finally obtain assignments to all-white schools. If desegrega-
tion is to be started, some personal hardship is inevitable. This problem forces a choice
of the lesser of two evils: courts may be expected to examine very closely the psychologi-
cal factors of which assignment boards take cognizance. Race is not a valid criterion;
distinctions based on factors traceable to race or to racial tensions will undoubtedly be
found invalid as devices to achieve by indirection the unconstitutional objective of main-
taining a segregated public school system.
This discussion will serve to illustrate the general concepts the courts are now
following. After determining whether the state assignment schemes are valid, the ap-
proach of the courts is to examine those plans in operation. As seen, these plans can-
not indefinitely preserve segregation; the courts will make sure that schools are con-
stitutionally administered, and this will mean that the races will be eventually integrated.
F. LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS.
Although there are no exact figures available, there is little doubt that the majority
of cases involving Negroes attempting to vindicate their constitutionally guaranteed
rights are directly aided or indirectly assisted by the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People. Some southern states have now taken steps to deprive
the negro litigant of this source of outside aid.
From one point of view, the lasting solution to the integration problem is the ter-
mination of NAACP activities within the state, either by absolute prohibition or by the
establishment of regulations so stringent that the group is no longer an effective instru-
ment in the struggle for civil rights. Alabama attempted the latter approach by requiring
the Association to produce membership records and other information from its files.
When it failed to comply with this, the Association was fined $100,000 for contempt by
the state supreme court and enjoined from doing all business within the state. However,
the United States Supreme Court held that such action was a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, since it entailed "the likelihood of a
substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's [NAACP] members of their right
to freedom of association."' 2 Upon remand, the Alabama Supreme Court reaffirmed its
contempt order, asserting that the United States Supreme Court decision had proceeded
on the "mistaken premise" that the NAACP had produced all documents demanded
except the membership lists.' 3 The court said there was nothing in the record to show
this, and therefore the Association was still in contempt. The dispute has been returned
to the Supreme Court for further action.'3 4
129-181 Hamm v. County School Bd. supra note 128.
132 NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
133 Ex parte NAACP, 109 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1959).
134 Docketed, NAACP v. Alabama, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3249 (U.S. March 10, 1959).
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A Virginia statute requiring registration of anyone engaging in activities affecting
integration or segregation has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as
a violation of freedom of speech.' 3 5 Other states have passed similar legislation, in-
cluding Arkansas 136 and Texas. 137 The Arkansas measure is directed at organizations
"engaged in activities designed to hinder, harass, and interfere with the powers and
duties of the State of Arkansas to control and operate its public schools .... -138 Such
legislation will probably be declared unconstitutional if it is tested in a federal court.
It is an open attempt to stop any organization or association from engaging in a legal
activity - the securing and maintaining of liberties guaranteed by the federal Con-
stitution.
Other approaches are being taken that present more subtle legal problems.
The Georgia Board of Education, for example, threatened revocation of the licenses
of teachers who were members of the NAACP, 139 but this position was later abandoned
and the matter was left in the hands of local school authorities. 140 In South Carolina
and Louisiana the NAACP appears on a list of organizations to which teachers may
not belong. 14 1 Even if these regulations are constitutional, 142 they probably will not
seriously cripple the effectiveness of the organization as a whole.
If the organization cannot be eliminated from the state and if all persons cannot be
prohibited from becoming members, the alternative is legislation barring such groups
from engaging in litigation and limiting the scope of their operations. Many states'
have adopted this course of action by enacting special barratry and maintenance
statutes.143 An example is the recent legislation of Arkansas. 144 Besides the filing re-
quirements noted above, 145 the exemption from unauthorized practice statutes pre-
viously afforded to certain organizations whose purpose was charitable or benevolent
or "for the purpose of assisting persons without means in the pursuit of any civil
remedy"' 46 has been eliminated. 147 A new barratry statute has been enacted which
reads in part: "Any person who counsels, proposes, encourages, aids or assists another
in the commission of acts tending to breach the peace, with the purpose of, or intention
of such acts resulting in litigation between individuals or an individual and the State or
an individual and any legal entity shall be guilty of the crime of barratry."' 48 The act
is further aimed toward "any person who has no direct and substantial interest in the
relief thereby sought.' 49 Persons include all corporations' 50 and punishment may be
$5,000 and/or two years imprisonment' 51 and any corporations guilty of violation
"shall be forever barred from doing any business or carrying on any activity" in the
135 NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), prob. juris. noted, sub nom. Harrison
v. NAACP, 358 U.S. 807 (1958). See 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 127 (1958).
136 ARK. AcTs 1958, Nos. 12 & 13.
137 TEx. RaV. Crv. STAT. ANN. Art. 2906-03 (Supp. 1958).
138 ARK. AcTs 1958, No. 12. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 319 S.W.2d 37 (Ark. 1958), up-
holding a Little Rock city ordinance requiring disclosure of NAACP contributors' names as a con-
dition of the Association's remaining a tax exempt organization.
139 N.Y. Times, July 12, 1955, p. 11, col. 2; id., Aug. 2, 1955, p. 15, col. 4.
140 N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1955, p. 25, col. 2.
141 Southern School News, Jan. 1957, p. 2, col. 4.
142 CI. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), and Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ.,
341 U.S. 716 (1951), where the Court sustained provisions requiring declarations of non-subversive
affiliations as a condition to employment as a teacher.
143 See statutes collected in 3 RAce RFL. L. RaP. 1257-77 (1958).
144 At the time of this writing, many of the state enactments have not yet been officially reported;
no attempt is made to compile a complete list. Arkansas has been chosen as it has been very active
in this area, and the focus of public attention has been centered there since the Little Rock incident.
Supra note 136.
145 Supra note 136.
146 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-209 (1947).
147 ARK. AcTs 1958, No. 11.
148 ARK. AcTs 1958, No. 14, § 1D.
149 Id. § IF.
150 Id. § 2.
151 Id. § 4.
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state and their charters will be revoked. 152 An effort to curb maintenance has been made
by requiring that affidavits be filed by both the party litigant and his attorney, stating
that no organization or association is maintaining the suit.153 It is worthy of note that
the above-mentioned Arkansas statutes are directed against organizations "interfering"
with public schools and their operation.' 54 At this time it is difficult to determine how
far the South will attempt to carry this type of legislation.
Little case law has arisen concerning these barratry and maintenance statutes.
As noted earlier, 155 the Alabama Supreme Court has reaffirmed its contempt finding
against the NAACP, 156 and the case is now in the Supreme Court for the second
time. 157 A lower federal court consisting of a special three judge panel has declined to
pass upon the Arkansas anti-NAACP statutes until the state courts have construed
them.158 Regardless of how these cases are ultimately decided, the NAACP and any
other organization supporting integration will face harassment in many southern states.
The barratry and maintenance statutes give these states a potent weapon. If the statutes
are upheld as constitutional, the operations of these organizations are certain to be
seriously hindered. Already the NAACP has admitted that such statutes have reduced
its effectiveness. 159
Do the underlying principles of Brown, James and Cooper reach far enough to
prohibit a state from barring various organizations from aiding litigants in seeking rights
that the Supreme Court has emphatically declared exist? It would seem that these
statutes have added a new dimension to the law of barratry and maintenance, since
the orthodox view is that something must be done that tends to obstruct the cause of
justice, or be done against public policy and with a bad motive, before the crime of
maintenance is committed. 160 "It has never been violative of law or public policy to
give financial aid to a poor suitor who is prosecuting a meritorious cause of action. In
the absence of any bargain to share the recovery, no just criticism can attach to one offer-
ing such friendly aid."' 61 Since these statutes are aimed at litigation in which Negroes
are attempting to gain admission to schools, it is believed that the Supreme Court would
consider a suit to vindicate an individual's civil rights a "meritorious cause of action."
Cooper v. Aaron' 62 has declared that purely obstructive tactics will not be tolerated.
IV: PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The judiciary has heretofore borne full responsibility for implementing the School
Segregation Cases.' Recently, a number of plans have been suggested whereby the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government would assume, in varying
degrees, a share of the responsibility for promoting desegregation. Several of the more
significant proposals merit discussion because it is possible that Congress in the near
future will enact legislation embodying some of these proposals or others which are
similar.
152 Id. § 3. It is to be noted that this is a mandatory provision.
153 ARK. AcTs 1958, No. 16.
154 For example, the Barratry Act begins "An Act to assist the administration of the educational
programs of the public schools .. " ARK. Acts 1958, Nos. 12 & 13.
155 See p. 773 supra.
156 Ex parte NAACP, 109 So.2d 138 (Ala. 1959).
157 Chicago Sun Times, March 22, 1959, p. 55, col. 1.
158 Id. col. 3. Following this ruling, the Arkansas legislature came forth with new filing require-
ments. ARK. AcTs 1959, No. 225.
159 "The NAACP says it is prevented by the new barratry act from helping Negroes financially
in school desegregation suits." Chicago Sun Times, March 22, 1959, p. 55, col. 2.
160 Farmers State Bank v. Owsley County, 314 Ky. 856, 238 S.W.2d 471 (1951). See generally,
Annot., 139 A.L.R. 620 (1941).
161 Jahn v. Champaign Lumber Co., 157 Fed. 407, 418 (W.D. Wis. 1908).
162 358 U.S. 1 (1953).
1 The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (Supp. V, 1957), established the
Civil Rights Commission but this body is authorized only to study and collect information concerning
the denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution, and to appraise the laws of the
federal government in respect thereto.
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A. THE JOHNSON BILL
Senate Bill 499,2 introduced by Senator Johnson at the last session of Congress,
provided for the creation of a community relations service as an independent agency of
the federal government. It cautiously recognized that the requirements of the Constitu-
tion "are giving rise, or may give rise, to disagreements in communities in the various
States disruptive to peaceful relations among the citizens of such communities." 3 The
purpose of this agency would be to provide assistance in conciliating these community
disagreements and eliminating the problems ensuing therefrom.4 It would cooperate
with state, local and private agencies. 5 The staff would consist of a director and five
assistants appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, plus the
necessary technical and clerical personnel. 6 The director would be authorized to establish
as many as five regional offices.
7
This proposal is designed to promote domestic peace. The community relations
service could ameliorate only those problems that would stem from the lack of satisfac-
tory means of communication between community leaders who hold opposing views
regarding desegregation. To the extent that the causes of resistance to desegregation go
deeper the proposed agency would be ineffective.
B. THE COLLINS PROPOSAL
Governor Collins of Florida8 has formulated a plan for the creation of federal com-
missions in each state with primary responsibility for the direction of desegregation in
public schools. 9 The purpose of each commission would be to determine in those locali-
ties under its consideration when, where and to what extent desegregation of the public
schools may be equitable. 10 It is asserted that the plan would facilitate desegregation
when and where it is feasible, while safeguarding against improvident, coerced desegre-
gation when and where it is not feasible.'1
Each commission would be composed of five members appointed by the President
from lists of names submitted by the governors of the states in which the commissions
are to be established.
12
The commissions would perform the following duties:
(1) offer counsel to individuals and school officials in resolving desegregation
problems;
(2) investigate allegations that individuals were being denied admission to
public schools because of race;
(3) consider problems related to desegregation upon the request of school
authorities;
(4) consider any plan for desegregation submitted by school authorities;
(5) approve, disapprove, direct modification or revision of plans submitted
by school authorities; and
(6) make such findings and grant such relief as may be appropriate.' 3
2 S. 499, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
3 Id. § 101.
4 "It shall be the duty of the Service, subject to the provisions of this title, to provide con-
ciliation assistance in communities where (1) disagreements or difficulties regarding the laws or
Constitution of the United States, or (2) disagreements or difficulties which affect or may affect
interstate commerce, are disrupting, or are threatening to disrupt, peaceful relations among citizens
of such communities." Id. § 102(a).
5 Id. § 103.
6 Id. § 104.
7 Id. § 105.
8 Former Chairman, National Governors' Conference, and Southern Governors' Conference.
9 See also Palmer, Resolving a Dilemma: Congress Should Inplement Integration, 45 A.B.A.J.
39 (1959) (a similar but less concrete proposal).
10 Draft bill entitled "The Equal Protection Act of 1959," § 4(a).
11 Address by Governor Collins, Southern Governors' Conference, Sept. 22, 1958.
12 Draft bill, supra, note 10, § 3.
13 Id.§6.
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The commissions would have original jurisdiction to determine cases involving
state action allegedly barring the admission of persons to public schools in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. The district courts would be deprived of jurisdiction to
hear such cases except to review and enforce the orders of the commissions, 14 unless
a commission fails to act on a complaint submitted to it.15 It is said that the commissions
would be better equipped as fact finders, and they could give continuing attention to
local developments while working with local officials and the public.' 6
Authority for. the plan is found in the fourteenth amendment which empowers
Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.'
7
The proposal is a moderate plan designed to solve desegregation problems by
allowing for a high degree of conciliation without implicitly negating the recognized
constitutional rights of the minority racial group. This question is also raised by the
Johnson Bill. It is not clear how much conciliation could be permitted consistently with
the School Segregation Cases.'8 A desire to preserve public peace does not justify state-
enforced segregation for "this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which
deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."' 9 Delaying desegregation
for reasons other than those enumerated in the Brown case would be unconstitutional.
Congress must take cognizance of this fact if it attempts to implement desegregation.
C. THE DOUGLAS BILL
The Douglas Bill,2 0 which was introduced at the last session of Congress under the
co-sponsorship of seventeen members of the Senate, is a comprehensive and far-reach-
ing proposal for the legislative implementation of desegregation.
The first noteworthy feature of the bill is its unequivocal endorsement of the
School Segregation Cases as expressing "the moral ideals of the Nation" and "the supreme
law of the land."
'21
The bill provides for technical and financial assistance to state and local com-
munities whose schools are still segregated. This would include the gathering and
distribution of information, conducting surveys, holding national and local conferences
on segregation problems, and establishing local advisory councils.22 The services of
trained specialists would be offered to school districts in the process of desegregating.
23
In addition, forty million dollars would be appropriated annually to assist local govern-
mental units to meet the costs of additional educational measures undertaken to eliminate
segregation in the public schools.
24
The bill also provides for federal legal assistance in securing the compulsory
desegregation of schools. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare would be
authorized to persuade local governments to begin desegregation. 25 If they refuse,
the Secretary could prepare a tentative plan for desegregating a specific school district
or other local governmental unit. The Secretary would seek the advice of local officials
and private citizens, and take into account local conditions.26 The plan would be pre-
sented to the appropriate local official. If it were not placed into effect, the Secretary
would hold a public hearing on the plan. An approved plan would then be published.
27
14 Id. §8.
15 Id. § 10.
16 Address by Gov. Collins, supra, note 11.
17 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
18 See pp. 740-47 supra.
19 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917); see also Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
20 S. 810, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
21 Id. § 102. In the five years following the Brown decision Congress gave no clear indication of
its approval.
22 Id. § 201.
23 Id. § 202.
24 Id. §§ 301-04.
25 Id. § 401.
26 Id. § 402.
27 Id. § 403.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
If a local governmental unit rejected or refused to comply with the Secretary's
approved plan, he could certify to the Attorney General that all efforts to secure
compliance with the Constitution had failed. The following provision would then be-
come operative:
The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to institute for or
in the name of the United States a civil action or other proceeding for preventive
relief, including an application for an injunction or other order, against the appropriate
officials of the State, municipality, school district, or other local governmental unit,
and any individual or individuals acting in concert with such officials to enforce
compliance with the approved plan.28
Another provision authorized the Attorney General to institute civil suits without
prior administrative action on the complaint of individuals alleging the deprivation of
equal protection of the laws because of race. However, the complainants must be unable
"for any reason" to seek effective legal protection.
29
The Attorney General is further authorized to institute a civil action against any
person preventing or threatening to prevent, or conspiring to prevent or hinder:
(1) any Federal, State or local official from according any person or group the equal
protection of the laws, or
(2) the execution of any court order protecting the right to the equal protection
of the laws.3O
Section 602 would severely test the doctrine that state action is a prerequisite for the
invocation of the fourteenth amendment. 31 This provision could be assailed as going
beyond the power of Congress,3 2 and it might also be argued that there is a violation of
the tenth amendment.
Section 603 embodies the traditional language of federal civil rights legislation. It
authorizes the Attorney General to institute proceedings for preventive relief against
anyone who, under color of state law, deprives or threatens to deprive any individual of
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The most controversial features of Senate Bill 810 are those which empower the
Attorney General to institute civil suits which now may be initiated only by private
individuals. The bill's opponents consider it a dangerous and unprecedented extension of
federal power which would infuriate the people of the states when applied. Its pro-
ponents consider it a reasonable proposal for the implementation of desegregation. They
urge that poverty, fear of economic retaliation and state anti-barratry laws may pre-
vent the negroes from vindicating their constitutional rights.
D. THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS
The President submitted a special message to Congress at its last session outlining a
seven-point proposal for Civil Rights legislation.33 In response, several bills relating to
desegregation were introduced.
The most significant of the Administration-supported proposals was Senate Bill
95534 which would have strengthened the law dealing with the obstruction of justice.35
28 Id. § 501(a).
29 "Whenever the Attorney General receives a signed complaint that any person is being deprived
of, or is being threatened with the loss of, the right to the equal protection of the laws by reason of
race, color, religion, or national origin and whenever the Attorney General certifies that, in his
judgment, such person or group of persons is unable for any reason to seek effective legal protection
for the right to the equal protection of the laws, the Attorney General is authorized to institute for
or in the name of the United States a civil action or other proceeding for preventive relief.
Id. § 601(a).
30 Id. § 602.
31 See pp. 728-29 supra.
32 §§ 501(a) and 601(a), under which private individuals acting in concert with state officials
may be subject to an injunction, may also be attacked on this ground.
33 105 Cong. Rec. 1661 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1959).
34 S. 955, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
35 See pp. 755-56 supra. There is some doubt whether the existing obstruction of justice statutes
apply to acts occurring after the completion of the court's proceedings; therefore, this proposal would
strengthen the judiciary's position in desegregation cases involving violence.
STUDENT ANALYSIS
The measure provided that the use of force or the threat of force to obstruct court
orders in school-segregation cases would be a crime. It would not apply to peaceful
defiance of court orders, or to situations where desegregation was proceeding without
judicial compulsion.
Senate Bill 95836 provided for technical aid to local agencies to assist them in mak-
ing the necessary adjustments required by school desegregation. State approval would
be a prerequisite for extending this assistance to the local governmental units. This aid
would be less extensive than that proposed in the Douglas bill. Senate Bill 95837 also
declares that "the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court is the supreme law
of the land."
Other civil rights legislation was proposed at the last session of Congress but its
bearing on the practical problems of desegregation is too remote to merit discussion.
The extent to which Congress will assist in the implementation of the School
Segregation Cases is now uncertain. It is nevertheless evident from this survey that the
judiciary may expect increasing support from the legislative branch of the federal
government.
36 S. 958, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
37 Ibid.
